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Conformism in opinions about the  
welfare state in Switzerland 
Results from a List Experiment 
Lionel Marquisi 
Institut d’Etudes Politiques, Historiques et Internationales, Université de Lausanne 
Résumé 
La désirabilité sociale est un biais de réponse, repérable dans toutes les méthodes 
d'interview, par lequel les individus cherchent à éviter l'opprobre frappant les opinions 
et comportements socialement stigmatisés en dissimulant leurs véritables préférences. 
Dans cette contribution, nous avançons que la désirabilité sociale concerne avant tout 
les personnes ambivalentes à propos d'un enjeu, ou celles qui ressentent peu d'intérêt 
pour celui-ci. Pour tester ces hypothèses, nous analysons les données d'une Expérience 
par Liste, dans laquelle des étudiants suisses ont été interrogés au sujet de leurs 
attitudes en matière de politique sociale. Une Expérience par Liste est une méthode 
permettant à certains sujets de s'exprimer librement, sans crainte d’être blamés pour 
avoir exprimé une opinion socialement "déviante", tandis que d'autres sujets restent 
conditionnés par l’influence normative du regard extérieur. Une comparaison entre ces 
deux groupes permet d’estimer la proportion d’individus « dissimulateurs » et 
d’identifier leur profil. Les résultats de l'expérience indiquent que 8 à 18 pour cent des 
sujets ont sans doute menti en répondant à trois questions : à propos de l'éligibilité 
aux prestations sociales, à propos de la discrimination à l'embauche, et de la manière 
la plus évidente à propos de l'équité fiscale. Les biais de désirabilité sont cependant 
plus prononcés au sein de certaines catégories : ils atteignent plus de 30 ou même 40 
pour cent des étudiants avec un faible niveau de connaissance politique, mais 
également des étudiants plus jeunes et de ceux suivant un cursus en science politique 
— ce qui va largement dans le sens de nos hypothèses. Des analyses supplémentaires 
suggèrent que les individus ont une tolérance limitée pour la dissimulation ; lorsqu'on 
leur présente une liste de questions, ils semblent considérer qu'un "petit mensonge" 
est acceptable, mais pas davantage. Finalement, les promesses et les limites de notre 
approche sont discutées dans la conclusion. 
Mots-clefs : désirabilité sociale, expérience par liste, attitudes, état social, Suisse 
Abstract 
Social desirability is a response bias affecting all interviewing methods, whereby people 
express opinions which do not correspond to their true preferences, in order to avoid 
being associated with socially undesirable opinions and behaviors. In this contribution, 
we argue that people are more likely to exhibit social desirability to the extent that 
they are ambivalent or have little involvement toward the issue at hand. To test these 
propositions we analyze the data from a List Experiment, where Swiss students were 
asked for their attitudes about welfare state policies. A List Experiment is an astute 
experimental design in which some subjects are induced to speak their mind freely, 
without fear of being blamed for having "socially deviant" opinions, while other 
subjects are left exposed to social normative influence. Simple between-group 
comparisons and recent refinements of the method allow to estimate the aggregate 
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proportion and the socio-political profile of "liars". The results of the experiment 
indicate that between 8 and 18 percent of subjects probably "lied" when answering 
about three items: about welfare entitlement (i.e., foreigners having the same rights to 
social services as Swiss citizens), about job nondiscrimination (i.e., of foreign against 
Swiss job seekers), and, most evidently, about tax fairness (i.e., more equity in tax 
policy, "even if I or my family were to be taxed more heavily"). Biases of this 
magnitude are relatively modest in comparison to other research (e.g., racial attitudes 
in the US). However, our findings indicate that social desirability responding (SDR) is 
more widespread among some categories represented in our sample of subjects. Most 
notably, SDR exceeded 30 or 40 percent of individuals with little political knowledge, of 
younger individuals, as well as of political science students, which is broadly consistent 
with our hypotheses. Additional analyses suggest that subjects tend to have a limited 
tolerance for lying; when confronted with a list of items, they seem to consider that 
"one little lie" is acceptable, but not more than that. Promises and limitations of our 
approach are discussed in the conclusion. 
Keywords : social desirability, list experiment, attitudes, welfare state, Switzerland 
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1. Introduction1 
This contribution explores whether and how social desirability affects public support 
for welfare state policies. Social desirability is the tendency of subjects to report 
attitudes or to exhibit behaviors which are at odds with their true preferences, in 
order to avoid being associated with socially undesirable opinions and behaviors. Put 
another way, social pressure and the fear of social exclusion lead to discrepancies 
between expressed (“overt”) and sincere (“covert”) opinions. As stated in more detail 
below, social desirability responding (SDR) has been established in many social and 
political domains. The question posed in this contribution is whether SDR also applies 
to welfare state policies, and whether SDR may be observed among university 
students, i.e., among individuals who are usually strong supporters of social 
protection. 
In recent years, research has focused on the contextual and individual 
determinants of SDR. Despite the accumulation of studies, however, empirical 
evidence has remained scattered, largely inconsistent, and difficult to generalize 
across settings. Accordingly, the causes of individual differences in SDR are still 
poorly understood. In this paper, we argue that SDR can be broadly conceived as 
the consequence (or byproduct) of two common mental states or dispositions. First, 
we hypothesize that SDR is especially likely for people who have conflicting views 
on an issue. In the present case, citizens are often ambivalent toward the welfare 
state because their values and self-interest have conflicting implications for 
assessing the desirable scope and degree of state intervention. When forming their 
opinion on an issue, some people may, for example, let their material self-interest 
prevail over public interest and over a number of their own values. In conditions 
where overt answers are required, however, the same people are expected to give 
more weight to considerations which are consistent with the perceived relevant 
social norm on the issue. Second, we assume that, on average, SDR is more 
common among individuals with a weak or diffuse political profile — people with 
less integrated or less differentiated attitude systems, and less involvement toward 
the political issues of interest. The theoretical approach underlying these two 
general hypotheses will be described in sections 2 and 3. 
To test our hypotheses, we use an unobtrusive method for detecting socially 
desirable responses (the “List Experiment”), which we present in section 4. Some 
two hundred students at a Swiss university were asked for their acceptance of 
specific arguments in favor of welfare state policies. Some of these arguments were 
deliberately chosen for their potential to elicit a conflict between material self-
interest and “politically correct” values, that is, a personal conflict between anti-
welfare and pro-welfare motivations. For example, we asked subjects whether they 
agreed with the statement that long-time foreign residents “should have the same 
rights to social services as Swiss citizens”. To be sure, not every student will 
experience conflict when confronted with this question — arguably only a few will 
do, for example those sharing “chauvinistic” attitudes toward welfare benefits. But 
students form a community with a more or less agreed-upon set of norms and 
expectations. Therefore, it might be expected that when inner conflicts are aroused 
by such “sensitive questions” they will be resolved through compliance with 
community norms.  
                                           
1  This contribution is based on a re-analysis of experimental data collected in fall 2006 at the 
University of Bern, Switzerland, using a new multivariate method for analyzing List Experiment 
data that was not available at that time. The findings presented here thus differ (though not 
substantially) from those issued previously in technical reports and conference papers. 
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Our empirical results are presented in section 5. The experimental design and post-
hoc analysis made it possible to assess the degree of “truthfulness” of opinions 
about three statements related to welfare state policies. To sum up, only a small 
proportion of subjects (typically less than 15 percent) are suspected of “lying” when 
answering questions about equivocal aspects of welfare policy. However, social 
desirability bias was found to be more pronounced among subjects with little politi-
cal knowledge, among younger subjects, and among political science students — to 
name the most significant examples. This is broadly consistent with our 
“ambivalence” and “non-involvement” hypotheses. 
From a methodological perspective, our results also make a contribution to SDR 
research in a number of ways. First of all, they show that the List Experiment 
method, originally conceived to explore the acceptance of “anger items” in large-N 
survey experiments, can be extended to ordinary opinion items (including focal 
items with very large acceptance rates) embedded in small-N experimental designs. 
Promises and limitations of our methodological approach are discussed in the 
conclusion of the paper. 
2. Theoretical background  
The literature on social desirability responding (hereafter SDR) points out that 
people sometimes hide their true feelings about an issue when they perceive that 
their feelings are at variance with a broad consensus on the issue. In many 
situations, “hiding one’s feeling” is shorthand for “lying”: people give fake answers 
to convey a positive self-image (e.g., Krysan, 1998; Berinsky, 2002; Krosnick, 
1999). In this section, we provide a theoretical account of why these SDR 
tendencies exist and how they occur in the larger process of opinion formation. 
 
2.1. Response editing 
SDR may be conceived as a specific output of a larger process known as “response 
editing”. When people are asked for their opinion on an issue, they do not simply 
retrieve an attitude about the issue from their long-term memory and verbalize it as 
accurately as they can. Instead, we assume that, most of the time, the so-called 
“attitudes” supposedly measured through standardized survey questions are in fact 
mere opinions formed “on the spot”. Like other scholars, we view attitudes not as 
fixed entities, but rather as transient, “temporary constructions” (Zaller and Feldman, 
1992; Wilson and Hodges, 1992; Wänke et al., 1996; Lord and Lepper, 1999; 
Schwarz and Bohner, 2001; Lord et al., 2004; Schwarz, 2007; Smith and Conrey, 
2007; Yzerbyt and Kuppens, 2009). These constructions are derived from whatever 
considerations happen to be salient in people’s mind at the moment they are asked 
for their opinion on some topic. To be sure, verbalized attitudes partly derive from 
the “true” underlying attitudes, values, or motivations to which they relate. But they 
are also heavily dependent on the many extraneous objects of consideration which 
are present in the broader response context. These objects are involved in an editing 
process, whereby attitudinal representations retrieved from memory are elaborated 
and adjusted to the incentives and requirements of the response context. This editing 
process includes “respondents’ attempts to distort answers to avoid embarrassment, 
inconsistency, or other consequences” (Tourangeau et al., 2000: 256; see also 
Tourangeau and Rasinski, 1988). 
Response editing occurs for many different reasons — for example, because 
respondents want to appear consistent in the answers they provide to related 
questions, because they strive for moderation and do not want to be considered too 
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partisan or extremist, or because they do not want to be associated with socially 
undesirable attitudes and behaviors (i.e., SDR). In other words, “social desirability 
operates as an editing process” (Holtgraves, 2004: 161) which tends to dissociate 
“edited” attitude self-reports from the more spontaneous responses made in the 
absence of social influence.2  
Importantly, response editing — and SDR in particular — is not a “deviant” feature of 
exceptional individuals or situations. Rather, it is a pervasive phenomenon involved in 
most day-to-day processes of opinion formation. Accordingly, SDR research has 
strived to determine under what circumstances individuals adjust their responses to 
the perceived “opinion mainstream”. It is generally admitted that SDR hinges on 
three types of factors: individual-level characteristics, item characteristics, and 
features of the response context. 
 
2.2. Context and item factors 
Depending on research goals, SDR can be conceived either as a fixed, built-in 
tendency, or as a more transient mechanism sensitive to the demands of a particular 
situation. This alternative has been conceived as a distinction between “response 
styles — biases that are consistent across time and questionnaires” and “response 
sets — short-lived response biases attributable to some temporary distraction or 
motivation” (Paulhus, 2002: 49). For example, the relevance of response sets varies 
with the degree of anonymity of responses and thus with the extent of “public 
embarrassment” created by socially undesirable answers (Paulhus and Reid, 1991). 
Accordingly, systematic differences in SDR have been found between different types 
of interviewing modes — including face-to-face interviews, self-administered 
computer surveys, Web surveys, and traditional CATI surveys (Holbrook et al., 2003; 
Presser and Stinson, 1998; Richman et al., 1999; Krysan and Couper, 2003; Brewer 
et al., 2004; Kreuter et al., 2008). Interestingly, it may be that publicity (as opposed 
to confidentiality) extends to situations in which responses are actually anonymous 
but are perceived to be socially engaging. Even totally anonymous, self-administered 
paper-and-pencil questionnaires may induce SDR. For what little “social interaction” 
there really is in such situations, it seems to be sufficient to elicit positive self-
descriptions and the endorsement of socially approved opinions.3  
                                           
2  Holtgraves (2004) found that response latencies were increased under experimental 
conditions that elicited the greatest concern with social desirability. Likewise, social desirability 
is related to one important component of response latency in telephone surveys — sensitive 
survey questions such as about racial issues take a fraction of a second longer to answer than 
other questions (Johnson, 2004). This suggests that SDR is indeed a controlled “editing 
process” where individuals retrieve the relevant information from memory, evaluate it, and 
sometimes “adjust” it to social norms before responding (Tourangeau et al. 2000: chap. 9; 
Holtgraves, 2004; Tourangeau and Yan, 2007). Alternatively, SDR may proceed in an 
“automatic” or “stereotypical” way (Schaeffer, 1999: 118-120), consistent with the notion that 
many people are accustomed to “lying in everyday life” (DePaulo et al., 1996). Likewise, 
“explicit” and “implicit” attitude measures tend to become increasingly uncorrelated as the 
social sensitivity of issues grows and therefore social desirability concerns play a greater role in 
the expression of explicit attitudes (Nosek, 2005; Greenwald et al., 2009; Knoll, 2013). 
3  Under anonymous conditions, evidence of SDR has been found for self-reports of sexual 
behavior (e.g., Meston et al., 1998; Fisher, 2007), abortion (e.g, Jones and Forrest, 1992), 
personal hygiene (e.g., Gordon, 1987), racial prejudice (e.g., Sniderman and Carmines, 1997; 
Krysan, 1998; Krysan and Cooper, 2003; Berinsky, 1999, 2002), religious service attendance 
(Presser and Stinson, 1998), voting turnout (e.g., Clausen, 1968; Holbrook et al., 2003; Highton, 
2005; Belli et al., 2006; Duff et al., 2007; Zeglovits and Kritzinger, 2014), voting for winners or 
incumbents (e.g., Wright, 1993; Mattei, 1998), and a whole array of social and political opinions 
and behaviors (e.g., Umesh and Peterson, 1991; Bradburn et al., 2004: chap. 3). 
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The fact that SDR occurs under anonymous conditions may sometimes be explained 
by the social norms that pervade a given community. As it was found, the degree of 
SDR varies with the larger social and political context of opinion formation and 
expression. Community pressure may arise even without a person’s disclosing her 
views to anyone from that community, through feelings of guilt or betrayal 
(Bernstein et al., 2001). Thus, the greater the social pressure to display socially 
acceptable responses and behaviors in a given community, the larger the extent of 
SDR — overreporting of turnout in election surveys is a case in point (e.g., Karp 
and Brockington, 2005). 
Beyond response context, item characteristics also play a role in SDR. For one thing, 
there is a gradation in the social sensitivity of issues — SDR is more widespread with 
respect to more sensitive issues. This is why both SDR and its predictors are largely 
issue-specific and situational, as meta-analyses of social desirability studies suggest 
(e.g., Richman et al., 1999; Tourangeau and Yan, 2007). 
  
2.3. Individual-level factors 
Individual determinants of SDR have first been studied in the field of personality 
psychology. In short, some individuals show a chronic disposition to SDR, while 
others do not (Paulhus, 1984, 2002; von Hippel and Trivers, 2011). Such dispositions 
need not concern us here, since it was not our objective to inquire into the personality 
foundations of SDR. In addition, the often-made distinction between conscious and 
non-conscious dimensions of self-enhancement is burred by the fact that the effect of 
social norms often goes unnoticed (Aarts et al., 2003; Nolan et al., 2008). Hence, 
individuals may provide socially desirable answers without conscious awareness of it.  
More important for our present purposes, a number of socio-demographic or political 
attributes can be expected to play a role as moderators of SDR. (Moderators are 
variables for which SDR scores significantly vary between categories). Unfortunately, 
however, a great deal of empirical research on the moderators of SDR is inconclusive, 
suggesting that the effects of such moderators are specific to the situation and to the 
opinions or behaviors to be tested.4 But there are other reasons why past studies 
have failed to yield meaningful generalizations about the moderators of SDR. To 
begin with, most of this research has overlooked the crucial fact that individual-level 
variables are involved in several distinct mechanisms. First, variables such as gender, 
age, ideology, or social class may influence people’s true preference on an issue. This 
is obvious in the case of welfare state preferences because redistributive policies 
have structured society along socio-demographic and economic lines opposing 
welfare recipient and contributor groups. Second, these variables may differentiate 
individuals according to how “sensitive” questions are perceived to be. As we explain 
in fuller detail below, people with less involvement in political affairs (e.g., younger, 
non-politicized individuals) should find socially deviant opinions more “threatening” 
and thus more difficult to endorse publicly. Third, the same variables may be 
                                           
4  Purported effects of individual variables on SDR are often contradictory from one study to the 
next. For example, a meta-analysis suggests that age and gender are only modestly related to 
SDR (Ones and Viswesvaran, 1998; see also Belli et al., 2001; Mesmer-Magnus et al., 2006). 
However, other research finds no gender gap and suggests that age is confounded with 
education, which actually may show either a negative or a positive relationship with SDR 
(Klassen et al., 1975; Presser and Traugott, 1992; Bernstein et al., 2001; Heerwig and McCabe, 
2009). In fact, all these relationships may vary according to the type of issue under consideration 
and to the type of SDR measure. For example, it has been found that higher education and 
middle-aged people are more prone to SDR with respect to the issue of electing a female US 
President, whereas women do not differ from men (Streb et al., 2008). Similarly, overreporting 
turnout in US elections was related either to highest or intermediate levels of political knowledge, 
political involvement, education, or age (Stocké and Stark, 2007; Belli et al., 2001). 
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important in determining which social norm is relevant for adopting “appropriate” 
opinions and behaviors in a given situation. For example, it may be of special interest 
to a pensioner to consider what other senior citizens think about some local issue; 
however, if the question at hand is how to reform the system of interregional fiscal 
transfers, the pensioner may turn to the population’s opinion in her region. 
Accordingly, we envision a multiplicity of potential norms rather than a single social 
norm to which everyone would refer, and the role of individual-level variables in the 
three above mechanisms should not be considered in isolation from properties of the 
question posed and from characteristics of the context. 
As the above analysis suggests, SDR may stem from complex interactions between 
characteristics of individuals, contexts, and items. We may now reformulate the idea 
that individual-level variables have several inputs into the SDR mechanism. On a 
purely logical basis, SDR is unlikely to occur if the respondent’s true opinion equates 
with the opinion inferred from the most relevant available source of social influence. 
This is not to say that social influence does not matter in such cases, but rather that 
it may only reinforce existing opinions and hence is difficult to detect by conventional 
methods. Formally, this means that the probability that an individual-level variable 
affects SDR through “response editing” can be independent from the probability that 
it contributes to the formation of a “true” opinion in the first place — be it socially 
desirable or undesirable. Thus, for any group corresponding to the jth value of a given 
variable, the average group SDR estimate should depend both on the group 
probability p(D)ij of disagreeing with the socially desirable item i, and on its 
probability p(A | D)ij of agreeing with the item, given initial disagreement, after some 
response editing mechanism has occurred: p(SDR)ij = p(D)ij × p(A | D)ij. An 
empirical test of this two-tiered process is difficult with standard methods. 
Nevertheless it has heuristic value for hypothesis generation. In particular, it points 
to the possibility that moderator variables such as education or left-right ideology 
may have a nonlinear relationship with SDR, provided that they are inversely related 
to p(D)ij and to p(A | D)ij.5 
As noted above, one difficulty in assessing the role of moderators in SDR is that their 
effects are often highly dependent on the particular context (as defined by situation 
and/or item characteristics) under study. However, if we are to try to specify the role 
of each moderator in each context, we might not be able to cope with the amount of 
necessary explanation and ad hoc hypotheses. Rather than a piecemeal approach, 
what we need is an integrating framework enabling us to predict commonalities across 
the various “moderator × context” circumstances. For example, this framework should 
help us understand why certain moderator variables tend to have the same effect on 
SDR when operating in some types of situations and different effects in other 
situations. In the next section, we follow this path and formulate two hypotheses 
which are general enough to accommodate a great variety of circumstances and 
concrete enough to allow for non-trivial predictions. 
                                           
5  Ideology is a relevant example. Left-wing individuals are unlikely to endorse neoliberal and 
chauvinistic appeals to welfare state retrenchment. But those leftists who do support cuts in 
social spending, notably for self-interest reasons, may have especially ambivalent attitudes 
toward social security and may be quite susceptible to the normative influence of their ideological 
group. Conversely, right-wing individuals are expected to back retrenchment, at least to some 
extent. But few of these welfare state opponents will be ambivalent enough to be moved by 
uncongenial social norms. As p(D) is almost certainly greater for right-wing subjects but p(A | D) 
is probably greater for left-wing subjects, it is uncertain for which group the end estimate p(SDR) 
= p(D) × p(A | D) will be greater. Depending on how moderate left and moderate right citizens 
fare with respect to these probabilities, the overall relationship of ideological self-placement with 
SDR may have various functional forms, including U-shaped and inverted-U-shaped. 
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3. Hypotheses 
Some people are, by disposition, more prone than others to engaging in conformist 
behavior. More often than not, however, SDR is a matter of circumstances. In this 
perspective, we argue that a potential for SDR arises when an individual’s mental 
state tends toward ambivalence or non-involvement. 
 
3.1. Ambivalence hypothesis (H1) 
First, we argue that SDR is especially likely for people who have conflicting views 
on an issue, in other words, for people who are ambivalent on that issue. Indeed, a 
general lesson from research on racial attitudes in the United States is that Democ-
ratic Party supporters are conflicted between their liberal (egalitarian) attitudes and 
their existing racial prejudices, making them most vulnerable to SDR (e.g., Kuk-
linski et al., 1997; Krysan and Couper, 2006; Dovidio et al., 2009). In a similar 
vein, ambivalence may arise because a person’s values and self-interest have 
different implications for the issue at stake.6  
Importantly, attitudes about the welfare state — in particular about the implementation 
of redistributive policies — are deeply rooted in material self-interest and in key social 
values such as equality, fairness, and solidarity (e.g., Taylor-Gooby, 2001; Arts and 
Gelissen, 2001; Hinnfors, 2008; Calzada et al., 2014). Citizens endorsing egalitarian 
values tend to back proposals to ensure universal coverage and to reduce inequalities 
in income and life chances — whether or not they are net recipients of state support. 
Hence, due to the continuing pervasiveness of these values and lasting popular 
support for social policies, the welfare state has long proved surprisingly resilient to 
cutbacks in public spending (Pierson, 1994; van Kersbergen, 2000; Brooks and 
Manza, 2006; Castles, 2007). 
However, in an era of permanent austerity and growing demographic pressure on state 
revenues, and more recently in times of severe economic crisis, these supportive 
values are increasingly challenged on two fronts. First, the rise of right-wing populist 
parties has promoted a new approach to the social role of the state known as “welfare 
chauvinism” (Banting, 2000; De Koster et al., 2013). In a nutshell, welfare chauvinists 
argue for giving priority to nationals in job recruitment and for restrictions in welfare 
eligibility that would exclude foreigners from a number of rights to social benefits. 
Second, the values conducive to welfare state support are challenged by the rise of 
neoliberal or neo-conservative ideologies underlying coordinated efforts to dismantle 
the welfare state (Korpi and Palme, 2003; Prasad, 2006). Importantly, neoliberal 
ideology puts a strong emphasis on the maximization of one’s interests. As far as 
European welfare states were built on the basis of a “coalition of solidaristic interests” 
and “voluntary cooperation” between various political actors, social classes, and “risk 
groups” (Baldwin, 1990; Korpi, 2001), this principle of solidarity and risk pooling is 
likely to be undermined by the pursuit of narrow self-interest.  
It is beyond dispute that the welfare state has created its own specific “clienteles” 
(e.g., pensioners, disabled people, or welfare-state employees; see Korpi, 2003). 
However, the stronghold of chauvinistic or neoliberal ideas in given constituencies 
may be expected to enhance the tendency of individuals to oppose whatever policies 
fail to provide (i) more personal benefits than personal costs; or (ii) more benefits to 
                                           
6  We focus here on this particular form of ambivalence, because we assume that values and 
self-interest are especially likely to have divergent implications for one’s attitudes. To be sure, 
however, it is by no means the only type of ambivalence that can matter for welfare state 
attitudes.  
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nationals than to immigrants. Indeed empirical research suggests that self-interest is 
most successful in predicting “attitudes most directly and tangibly related to the 
welfare of the interested person” rather than “at higher levels of attitude abstraction” 
(Kumlin, 2007: 370-1; see also Kumlin, 2004). In particular, categories of voters 
may be driven by the prospect of beneficial tax cuts. In a related way, the strength of 
utilitarian motives is manifest in the greater popular support for programs aiming at 
improving security, relative to programs designed to achieve equality (Ross, 2000). 
Hence, policies such as guaranteed basic income will draw relatively little support if 
they can be framed as providing most benefits to “marginal” groups such as 
immigrants or disabled people (e.g., Bay and Pedersen, 2006).  
Accordingly, we assume that many individuals are fundamentally ambivalent toward 
social policy. They are regularly exposed to competing arguments about the proper 
role of welfare institutions. In turn, these arguments enhance the memory 
accessibility of people’s relevant dispositions, namely their value attachment to 
welfare policy goals and their material self-interest as welfare state contributors and 
recipients. Thus, citizens are likely to face any particular welfare reform proposal with 
both types of considerations in mind, and these may pull their opinions on the issue 
at hand in opposite directions (e.g., Mau, 2003: 23-27). For example, a house owner 
might support a new state-subsidized housing program to relieve families in need, 
but at the same time she might be reluctant to put additional burden on state 
finances to create benefits for which she is not eligible and which may entail tax 
increases. In fact, empirical studies of welfare state support have often considered 
the potential conflict between self-interest and values (e.g., Chong et al., 2001; 
Feldman and Steenbergen, 2001; Jaeger, 2006; Matthews and Erickson, 2008). This 
being said, both values and appeals to self-interest are reflected in the various social 
norms to which individuals may conform. To be sure, a strict separation of self-
interest and values is not entirely justified, because it may be argued that self-
interest is itself a social norm. Indeed it is such a powerful norm, at least in some 
contexts, that it contributes to its own confirmation and becomes self-fulfilling (e.g., 
Schwartz, 2012). According to one scholar, “the theory of self-interest has spawned a 
norm of self-interest, the consequence of which is that people often act and speak in 
accordance with their perceived self-interest solely because they believe to do 
otherwise is to violate a powerful descriptive and prescriptive expectation” (Miller, 
2001: 194). 
In cases of ambivalence, where values and self-interest give way to contradictory 
decision incentives, various individual and contextual circumstances may then 
determine which of the two types of dispositions will prevail. For example, self-
interest may be especially likely to “crowd out” value-laden motives in certain types 
of welfare regime (Linos and West, 2003), in countries with low unemployment rates 
(Blekesaune and Quadagno, 2003), or within specific welfare recipient groups related 
to social class, age, gender, or income (Svallfors, 1997; Kulin and Svallfors, 2013).7 
Most importantly, ambivalent individuals can turn to social norms for assistance in 
evaluating the issue at stake. Specifically, social normative influence is arguably 
highest when individuals are ambivalent and suspicious that their opinions might be 
“overheard” or “leaked” to third parties. In such cases, individuals are likely to follow 
                                           
7  In addition to these structural factors, situational factors may determine the relative impact 
of self-interest and values on welfare state attitudes. For example, the specific form of 
questions targeting welfare support has been shown to “frame” the answers given by 
respondents. Support for redistribution is tremendous when questions are posed at a general, 
abstract level (e.g., “In society, the strong groups must care for the weaker ones”), but it 
plummets as soon as specific policies or recipient groups are mentioned (Kangas, 1997). 
Likewise, small changes in question wording can have a substantial impact on the measured 
level of welfare state support. Such “framing effects” are entirely consistent with our view of 
attitudes as temporary constructions. 
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the perceived relevant norm in order to avoid “public embarrassment” or feelings of 
guilt, and thus to escape fear of social exclusion. 
As we alluded to above, an individual usually has several sources of normative 
influence, which so to speak compete for defining his or her social identity. 
Combining social desirability and social identity theories, we assume that 
individuals will pick different “reference groups” on different issues, depending on 
which of their multiple social identities are currently salient (e.g., Abrams and 
Hogg, 1990; Reicher and Hopkins, 1996; Wood, 2000; Levine et al., 2005).8 Put 
differently, when multiple social identities and social norms are currently salient, 
and when these norms do not converge to the same definition of what is socially 
desirable, people may cope with cross-pressures by aligning with the group whose 
influence is perceived as most important or most diagnostic in determining the 
“socially appropriate” answer. Therefore, depending on specific individuals and 
situations, the activation of social norms will tend to trigger either specific values or 
personal material interests and thus to reinforce either pro-welfare or anti-welfare 
opinions. In other words, to become fully operational our ambivalence hypothesis 
has to be tailored to each specific situation.  
In the present study, subjects were recruited among Swiss University students (see 
section 4). In this context, the dominant pro-welfare norm of the Swiss students’ 
community may be so strong as to affect virtually every respondent — not only 
ambivalent respondents. To be sure, students who do not endorse egalitarian values 
and have vested interests against redistributive policies may be more likely express 
their opposition to such policies when the response context is perceived to be free 
from social constraints and sanctions. But many of them have probably developed 
social identities (e.g., through their membership in more intimate peer groups) which 
countervail the “dominant” norm in their community and prompt them to speak out 
their opinions irrespective of the response context. In contrast, individuals who are 
ambivalent about welfare policies are expected to conform to the perceived majority 
opinion — in this case, this would mean complying with the predominantly leftist and 
pro-welfare attitudes of the “campus community”. Accordingly, in this case, 
ambivalent individuals should be more likely to support welfare policies in “public” 
settings than they would in more private conditions. 
Overall, this “inner conflict resolution” hypothesis is consistent with the idea that SDR 
is a response editing mechanism. There is actually a body of empirical studies showing 
that both attitudinal ambivalence and minority status (i.e., the degree to which one’s 
opinion is thought to deviate from the perceived social norm) lead to hesitation and 
discomfort in expressing one’s opinions.9 Drawing on our conceptual analysis of SDR, 
we propose to bridge the gap between these phenomena and assume that SDR is 
enhanced under conditions of attitudinal ambivalence. 
                                           
8  The term “reference groups” is used here in a generic sense to encompass all possible sources 
of social influence, ranging from primary groups and in-groups (e.g., based on profession, class, 
religion, or ethnicity) to mass media opinion and “mass opinion” at any conceivable level. 
9  For example, questions about issues that elicit value conflicts (e.g., women quotas in companies, 
an issue that tends to pit equality against merit) result in increased response times (Bassili and 
Fletcher, 1991; Sniderman and Carmines, 1997: 86-88). Likewise, issue opinions which are 
inconsistent with ideological orientations (as in the case of a liberal opposed to abortion rights) take 
more time to report than consistent opinions (Huckfeldt and Sprague, 2000). Interestingly, reaction 
times are also increased when respondents perceive their opinions to be at odds with those 
prevailing in their close interpersonal networks or in an important reference group (Huckfeldt and 
Sprague, 2000; Bassili, 2003; Huge and Glynn, 2013). Finally, an individual’s willingness to express 
her political opinions has been shown to decrease with growing perceptions of a hostile “climate of 
opinion”, but only when she is relatively uncertain about her opinions (Matthes et al., 2010). It 
could even be demonstrated that “faking” ambivalence is a frequently used strategy to avoid 
expressing one’s opinion in a hostile opinion climate (Hayes, 2007). 
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3.2. Non-involvement hypothesis (H2) 
Our second general hypothesis states that, on average, SDR is more common 
among individuals with a weak or diffuse political profile. By this we mean people 
with less integrated or less differentiated attitude systems, and less involvement 
toward the political issues of interest. Hence, social desirability is hypothesized to 
be more prevalent for people low in political knowledge, low in interest about the 
issues at hand, with less political experience, or with weaker or less salient political 
attitudes. One reason is that such people are less committed to (and less confident 
in) their own attitudes, less assertive in expressing their opinions, and less willing 
to defend a socially undesirable position.  
For example, “defensive confidence” (i.e., an individual’s self-perceived ability to 
counterargue when uncongenial information is encountered) has been shown to 
correlate positively with usual indicators of political involvement such as political 
participation, attention to politics, or political knowledge (Albarracin and Mitchell, 
2004; Albarracin et al., 2012). More importantly, individuals who lack defensive 
confidence and political involvement tend to be uncomfortable with speaking their 
mind — they fear being negatively evaluated by others, and are reluctant to 
express themselves in public. This strongly suggests that socially unorthodox 
opinions are potentially more threatening to the self-image of people with less 
cognitive resources or less involvement in political affairs. To some extent, then, 
our second hypothesis is more detached from concrete political issues than the 
first, and it has more to do with “political personality”. Thus it subscribes to the 
notion that social desirability is a manifestation of ego defense and represents an 
attempt at “impression management” (e.g., Paulhus and Reid, 1991). 
Another reason why SDR is more prevalent for low-involvement individuals is that 
they lack strong and important beliefs about political issues, from which attitude 
statements can be automatically and/or effortlessly derived. Even those scholars 
who view attitudes as “stable and transparent” (van Harrenveld and van der Pligt, 
2004; van der Pligt and de Vries, 1998) acknowledge that the role of the response 
context, which includes incentives to conform to social norms, is enhanced for the 
expression of attitudes based on weak beliefs or attributes. Conversely, individuals 
who hold intense and firm attitudes are more assertive of their opinions and more 
willing so express them in a straightforward manner (Neuwirth et al., 2007; 
Matthes et al., 2010). Likewise, people with more cognitive resources (such as well-
educated and politically knowledgeable citizens) are better able to connect their 
abstract values to concrete social policies (Kulin and Svallfors, 2013). Therefore, 
their welfare state attitudes should be more dependent on values and less 
vulnerable to the effect of contextual cues. 
 
3.3. Research question: Effects of item characteristics 
Finally, to our hypotheses we add a research question concerning the effects of 
item characteristics. As we have argued above, the profile of people most 
susceptible to SDR will change according to the issues and to the way in which 
issues are framed in the questions. In other words, the “social sensitivity” of an 
issue is defined situationally, and the specific types of individuals to which our 
hypotheses apply will not be the same across issues. In assessing the role of issue 
questions, we will pay attention to the following features: the values to which 
issues appeal (e.g., equality vs. fairness); the main frame challenging these values 
(e.g., welfare chauvinistic or neoliberal); and the degree of concreteness and 
personalization of issues, as framed by the questions.  
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Using an experimental approach, our hypotheses will be tested with subjects 
recruited at the same time at the same university. This guarantees that the 
response context is, to a large extent, the same for all participants and that 
education level (known to affect both “private” and “public” opinions) is more or 
less constant. In turn this will increase our confidence in attributing variations in 
SDR to our focal individual-level variables, designed to measure ambivalence and 
political involvement, and to variations in item properties.  
4. Measuring social desirability  
on welfare state issues 
The goal of the experimental approach presented in this section is twofold. First, it is 
designed to observe whether and to what extent SDR manifests itself with respect to 
social spending and other welfare state issues. SDR on these issues may be less 
widespread than on more sensitive social problems such as race, homosexuality, or 
personal health (e.g., Berinsky, 2004). However, issue sensitivity is highly dependent 
on the context and on the framing of questions. As we suggest below, a substantial 
part of Swiss respondents should be caught in a dilemma between their commitment 
to pro-social values and the defense of their material interests, and these “cross-
pressures” are expected to lead to SDR. Second, our experiment is tailored to 
identify those individuals most susceptible to SDR. To this aim, SDR estimates are 
computed for different subgroups of subjects (e.g., “low” vs. “high” political knowledge 
subjects). In total, ten variables will be measured to test particular aspects of the 
ambivalence and non-involvement hypotheses (see section 4.4). 
 
4.1. Empirical ground: Swiss welfare policy 
Like other states with a long democratic tradition, Switzerland was paradoxically 
late in introducing social security programs (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 14-16). As its 
development was both constrained and triggered by federalism, direct democracy, 
and religious factors (Armingeon et al., 2004; Manow, 2004; Obinger et al., 2005; 
Kriesi and Trechsel, 2008: chap. 10), the Swiss welfare state at the national level 
has lagged behind that of most other Western countries. Although Switzerland has 
been catching up with social-democratic and conservative regimes in the last 
decades, it was classified by Esping-Andersen (1990) in the “liberal” type of his 
famous threefold typology of welfare-state regimes (but see Trampusch and Mach, 
2011). Swiss citizens’ attitudes toward welfare are perhaps less deeply rooted in a 
long-standing commitment to social protection than is the case in other countries. 
These attitudes, in particular about policies that were recently introduced in the 
legislation (e.g., disability insurance, maternity leave), may be less resilient to 
attacks from neoliberal and populist quarters than they are in other countries.  
But, more importantly, Switzerland is unique worldwide in submitting many proposals 
for welfare state reform to a popular vote. For example, no less than 29 referenda in 
the last hundred years (and half of them in the last 25 years) have been concerned 
with the development, regulation or financing of the Swiss pension system. These 
popular votes are golden opportunities for proponents of welfare state retrenchment 
to achieve immediate goals — stopping further expansion of welfare schemes or 
imposing cuts in social benefits. But these votes, as well as the campaigns preceding 
them, are also instrumental in the long run, as they put the idea of retrenchment on 
the political agenda and challenge established social rights by questioning their 
“irreversible” character.  
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Retrenchment as a legitimate political question will necessarily imbue popular 
attitudes toward the welfare state. This is reflected most directly in the substantial 
number of retrenchment and expansion proposals which have been respectively 
accepted and refused by majorities of Swiss citizens in popular votes. However, 
consistent with the “compensation strategy” outlined by Pierson (1994), the most 
successful retrenchment proposals have been the ones that combined retrenchment 
and expansion elements, while proposals “lacking such an expansionary component 
have been systematically rejected by voters” (Obinger et al., 2005: 291). This 
suggests a preference among Swiss voters for optimizing, rather than maximizing, 
the allocation of public resources for welfare programs (Roosma et al., 2013). This 
boils down to emphasizing the security goal of the welfare state rather than its 
equality goal, and it implies a commitment to the welfare state’s central function of 
protecting people from the hardships of old age, extreme poverty, sickness and 
disability, and unemployment. In contrast, equality-seeking policies in the domains 
of housing, child care, or employment (e.g., family benefits, active labor-market 
policies) may be viewed as less vital for income maintenance and redistribution, 
and hence are less popular among Swiss citizens. In particular, state protection 
against job discrimination (one of our test items below) may seem too remote from 
the core functions of the welfare state to receive significant support. 
In short, Swiss citizens are accustomed to seeing debates on welfare state reform 
as a routine exercise in trade-off and compromise, rather than as a deep conflict 
between irreconcilable cultures of the state. Also consistent with the assumed 
legitimacy of retrenchment arguments is the absence of significant bias in media 
coverage of voting issues. As far as newspaper reporting is concerned, there is no 
particular slant in the presentation of issues, which means that pro-welfare and 
anti-welfare opinions are given about the same chance of influencing public debates 
on welfare reform in Switzerland (Marquis et al., 2011).  
 
4.2. Measurement strategy 
SDR has been measured by a variety of techniques (for reviews, see Nederhof, 1985; 
King and Bruner, 2000; Paulhus, 2002; Tourangeau and Yan, 2007; Krosnick and 
Presser, 2010). Astute interviewing procedures have been experimented to elicit 
unbiased opinions by manipulating the attractiveness of socially desirable responses. 
In methods such as “the bogus pipeline”, respondents are warned that any lie or 
exaggeration will be detected by a “physiological monitoring device” and are thus 
encouraged to provide reliable answers (Jones and Sigall, 1971; Dwight and 
Donovan, 2003). But the same goal can be achieved by inducing respondents to 
believe exactly the opposite — that there is no way to know what they actually 
responded! One version of this technique is known as the “Item Count Technique” 
(Droitcour et al., 1991) or as the “List Experiment” (e.g., Sniderman and Carmines, 
1997). As it is the method that we selected to assess SDR on welfare state issues, it 
deserves further explanation.  
The List Experiment has been used in various settings involving sensitive social 
issues.10 For example, in the domain of racial politics, the basic purpose of the 
technique “is to persuade respondents that they can express hostility toward blacks 
without anyone’s being aware that they have done so” (Kuklinski et al., 1997: 327). 
                                           
10  These issues include voting for a female or Black US President (Streb et al., 2008; Flavin 
and Keane, 2008; Heerwig and McCabe, 2009), support for a Jewish presidential candidate 
(Kane et al., 2004), attitudes toward immigration (Janus, 2007, 2010) and same-sex marriage 
(Lax et al., 2014), allowing illiterate people to vote in Lebanon (Corstange, 2009), and support 
for liberal racial policies and assistance for minorities (Kuklinski et al., 1997; Sniderman and 
Carmines, 1997; Sniderman and Hagendoorn, 2007; Zigerell, 2011). 
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We set up a similar experiment to gauge the degree of “conformism” in opinions 
about the welfare state. We chose to focus on issues which are potentially divisive 
but may enjoy some “fake consensus” because of social desirability. These issues 
were summarized in three statements on which subjects were invited to express their 
opinions: 
1. “Foreigners should have the same rights to social services as Swiss citizens, if they 
have lived and worked for a long time in Switzerland” (welfare entitlement) 
2. “Foreign job seekers with equal skills and experience should not be discriminated 
against in favor of Swiss job seekers” (job nondiscrimination) 
3. “Taxes should be collected more fairly, even if I or my family were to be taxed 
more heavily” (tax fairness) 
Statements 1 and 2 were conceived to appeal to the value of equality, but in such a 
way as to make an alternative frame, namely “welfare chauvinism”, immediately 
relevant and applicable. Besides, the concreteness of these two issues was low 
(Statement 1) to moderate (Statement 2), and the wording of questions was 
impersonal. As for Statement 3, it was conceived to prime the value of fairness (or 
equity) while also activating self-interested considerations. In contrast to 
Statements 1 and 2, it was quite concrete in its practical implications and was 
termed in personal terms (“I or my family”). As formulated in our Research 
Question, it is the purpose of the forthcoming empirical analysis to assess whether 
these variations in item features are associated with differences in SDR level. 
All these statements constitute “test items”, as we call them, whose goal is to 
present a socially acceptable position that most students probably share or feel 
compelled to agree with. This expectation was largely met: Only 6 percent, 18 
percent, and 12 percent of subjects expressed a “socially reprehensible opinion” by 
saying that they disagreed with the test items 1, 2, and 3, respectively. In other 
words, a very large majority of subjects concurred with the prevailing view in the 
students’ community.  
Each of the test items was embedded in a list of four items along with three 
“baseline items”, i.e., three other statements which a pre-test had shown to have 
well-defined response expectancies (see Appendix A for the list of all statements). 
Two of these additional statements may be considered “universally acceptable” and 
the third one “universally unacceptable”.11 The purpose of the baseline items is to 
determine whether, and how far, the large consensus on test items is actually the 
product of social desirability. As a matter of fact, the experimental design relies 
on the fact that only some participants were required to express overt opinions on 
the given statements. The subjects were randomly divided into three groups: a 
control treatment (hereafter CTRL), a first test treatment (ITEM4), and a second 
test treatment (ITEM3). These three groups are roughly similar in size (N=71, 66, 
and 68, respectively) and are identical from the perspective of all variables to be 
used in the empirical analysis (all ps from χ2 tests > .57).12  
In the CTRL condition, subjects were asked to give (overt) opinions about each of 
the 12 Statements (i.e., 3 Lists × 4 Statements). This group constitutes a baseline 
                                           
11  For two thirds of items, the ratio of unexpected responses (i.e., responses that contradicted 
the a priori acceptability or unacceptability criteria) did not exceed 7% of valid responses. 
12  One significant exception is the fact that there are twice as many binationals and foreigners 
in the ITEM3 group as in each of the two other groups (χ2=6.70, p=0.035). Given the random 
assignment to groups, the concentration of half the number of binationals and foreigners in the 
ITEM3 group can only be explained, to the best of our knowledge, by the kind of “randomization 
flaws” that must occur every now and then with low-N samples. 
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condition against which to gauge the amount of social desirability.13 It is the basis 
for calculating the acceptance ratio of the test item under conditions where SDR is 
expected to occur (overt expression of opinions).14 In the ITEM4 condition, subjects 
were not asked to offer opinions on the statements. Instead, the question read: 
“Below you will find a list of arguments that are often voiced in public debates. After 
reading all statements, please indicate how many statements you (rather or 
definitely) agree with. We do not want to know which statements you would approve, 
but only how many — that is, from 0 to 4”. In the ITEM3 condition, subjects were 
presented with the same list of statements, but this time without the test item, and 
asked to indicate the number of statements they approved (i.e., from 0 to 3).  
In answering such a question, subjects in both ITEM4 and ITEM3 conditions probably 
realized that there is no way for the experimenter to determine whether the test item 
is part of the items they refuse, nor to determine which items are refused or accepted 
whatsoever (unless they accept or refuse all items, of course). Indeed, it is impossible 
to know which subjects accepted or refused the test item. But the experimenter can 
determine the aggregate proportion of subjects who answered either way. To do so, 
she just needs to compare the figures that she gets from the two test conditions. In 
other words, if we assume the successful randomization of subjects in the various 
conditions, subtracting the average number of accepted items in the ITEM3 condition 
from the average number in the ITEM4 condition yields a rough estimate of the true 
acceptance ratio for the test item. This estimate is supposedly purged of social 
desirability bias, in contrast to the acceptance ratio measured through direct 
questioning in the CTRL group. Accordingly, the extent of social desirability responding 
on the test item can be easily computed as a difference-in-means estimator: SDR = 
MCTRL – (MITEM4 – MITEM3). In the example below, one can estimate that 16 percent 
of subjects probably lied when agreeing with the test item in the CTRL condition: 
CTRL ITEM4 ITEM3 
Indicate whether you agree  
with the following statements Yes    No 
Indicate how many sta-
tements you agree with 
Indicate how many sta-
tements you agree with 
• Baseline item 1       • Baseline item 1 • Baseline item 1 
• Baseline item 2       • Baseline item 2 • Baseline item 2 
• Test item       • Test item • Baseline item 3 
• Baseline item 3       • Baseline item 3  
  I agree with ___ items I agree with ___ items 
MCTRL = 0.85 (85% agreeing w. test item) MITEM4 = 2.92 items MITEM3 = 2.23 items 
SDR = MCTRL – (MITEM4 – MITEM3) = 0.85 – (2.92 – 2.23) = 0.16  
 
This difference-in-means method has been applied since the invention of the List 
Experiment technique in the early 1990s. Comparing counts within specific subgroups 
(e.g., subjects with low vs. high education) enabled researchers to identify plausible 
predictors of SDR. This method, however, hardly allows for a true “multivariate” 
                                           
13  This CTRL condition does not appear as such in the seminal studies that introduced the List 
Experiment procedure into political science (e.g., Kuklinski et al., 1997; Sniderman and 
Carmines, 1997). Their CTRL (i.e., “baseline”) condition corresponds to the ITEM3 group here, 
while their test condition is the present ITEM4 group. In fact, the designations used in the 
various studies are only a matter of definition. 
14  It may be noted that subjects in the CTRL group are asked to indicate their approval of 
items on four-grade scales ranging from “definitely disagree” to “definitely agree”, with “rather 
disagree” and “rather agree” as intermediate response categories. Unlike with dichotomous 
response choices (such as in the example above), the possibility to express a “mild” opposition 
to the test item may elicit more honest responses and therefore reduce SDR. 
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analysis.15 Fortunately, considerable progress has been made in recent years in the 
development of a true multivariate framework for analyzing list experiment data. In a 
first decisive step, Glynn (2010, 2013) and Imai (2011) have drawn attention to 
hitherto unexplored properties of count lists. They have shown that it is possible to 
determine the joint distribution of approval of the test item and approval of baseline 
items. For example, one can compute the aggregate proportion of respondents that 
honestly approve of the test item and approve of exactly two baseline items. To 
demonstrate this, Table 1 takes the example of our List 2 (containing the sensitive 
item “job nondiscrimination”). It first displays the relative frequencies of the number k 
of approved items among the ITEM4 and ITEM3 groups (rows 1 and 3), as well as the 
cumulative frequencies of approving at least k items (rows 2 and 4). Because the only 
difference between the ITEM4 and ITEM3 lists is the sensitive item, one can subtract 
the cumulative frequencies and deduce the estimated proportion of respondents in the 
population who jointly endorse the sensitive item and any k-1 number of baseline 
items. As Glynn (2010: 13) observes, the sum of all these joint proportions (0.713) is 
strictly equal to the difference-in-means estimate (2.344 ‒ 1.631 = 0.713).  
In several respects, however, the joint proportions from Table 1 are much more 
informative than the difference-in-means estimate. Going one step further, one can 
estimate the probability of approving the test item, conditional on the number of 
accepted items. For example, we know from row 5 in Table 1 that an estimated 31.9% 
of population respondents accepted the test item and two control items [2,1], that is, a 
total of three items. In turn, this proportion can be compared to the 34.4% of ITEM4 
respondents who accepted three items, no matter which type (i.e., either three control 
items [3,0] or two control items and the test item [2,1]). The ratio of these two 
proportions, 0.319/0.344, indicates that an estimated 92.5% of respondents from the 
ITEM4 group who reported agreeing with three items endorsed the test item as part of 
these three accepted items (figures for this example are in bold in Table 1). Likewise, 
the same 31.9% estimate of the population who accepted the test item and two 
baseline items can be compared to the 44.6% of ITEM3 respondents who accepted two 
items (and were not given the opportunity of choosing the test item anyway); the 
resulting ratio of 0.319/0.446 indicates that an estimated 71.4% of respondents from 
the ITEM3 group who reported agreeing with two items would have accepted the test 
item if given the chance to do so (figures for this example are underlined in Table 1). 
Table 1: Estimated joint and conditional probabilities from List 2 
 Number of reported items (k)  
 
0 1 2 3 4 Sum 
1. Proportion reporting exactly k items (ITEM4) 0.033 0.098 0.443 0.344 0.082 1.000 
2. Proportion reporting at least k items (ITEM4) 1.000 0.967 0.869 0.426 0.082 
 
3. Proportion reporting exactly k items (ITEM3) 0.031 0.415 0.446 0.108 0.000 1.000 
4. Proportion reporting at least k items (ITEM3) 1.000 0.969 0.554 0.108 0.000 
 
5. Estimated population P endorsing the test 
item and k-1 control items (row 2 – row 4) 0.000 0.000a 0.315 0.319 0.082 0.713 
6. Estimated conditional probability (ITEM4) 0.000 0.000 0.712 0.925 1.000 
 
7. Estimated conditional probability (ITEM3) 0.000 0.758 0.714 0.761 — 
 
Note: a: the real value (-0.002) was truncated to zero, because it is nonsensical and most likely due to 
small sample size (see Glynn 2010: 14-19). This problem is alleviated in the model presented below. 
                                           
15  In trying to control for multicollinearity and omitted variable bias, one can split the data and 
run difference-in-means tests in separate subsamples. But breaking down subjects into 
increasingly small subgroups leads to degrees-of-freedom problems (e.g., less precise and less 
statistically significant estimates) without really alleviating the above problems.  
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As our last sentence above suggests, the procedure used in Table 1 depends on the 
effective randomization of subjects between the ITEM3 and ITEM4 experimental 
conditions. Of course, this implicit assumption will tend to be more easily verified as 
the sample size increases. Nonetheless, the last rows of Table 1 can be considered 
the “fundamental building blocks for treating the sensitive item as missing data (e.g. 
multiple imputation, the EM algorithm, or data augmentation), which allows 
multivariate modeling of the sensitive item” (Glynn, 2010: 14). Indeed, the absence 
of a direct question about the sensitive item compares to situations where the 
variable of interest is missing. More importantly, however, the joint and conditional 
probabilities estimated in Table 1 provide considerable leeway for developing a true 
multivariate analysis of the determinants of the acceptance of the test item. Building 
on the properties of list experiments discussed above, Blair and Imai (2012; Blair et 
al., 2014) have developed an expectation-maximization algorithm whose aim is to 
model the impact of several individual characteristics on the joint distribution of test 
and baseline items approval.16 Implemented through the R “List” package designed 
by Blair and Imai (2014), this multivariate regression analysis enables us to compute 
the predicted probability of “truly” accepting the test item in all subgroups relevant to 
the test of our hypotheses (see section 4.4). We denote this probability as LISTT. 
Likewise, Blair and Imai’s procedure estimates the effects of the same set of 
predictors on the number of accepted baseline items (hereafter LISTB). In addition, 
we can compute the corresponding group-based probability of accepting the test 
item in the CTRL group via logistic regression, which we denote as ACT. The extent 
of SDR is then quite simply calculated, in each group, as SDR = ACT – LISTT.  
This measurement strategy is predicated on two further assumptions — beyond 
that of experimental randomization. First, we have to assume that opinions about 
the test item, and not about other items, are responsible for the between-treatment 
difference in the number of accepted items. In other words, list experiments have 
to make the “no design effect assumption” that “the addition of the sensitive 
item does not change the sum of affirmative answers to the control items” (Blair 
and Imai, 2012: 51; see also Imai, 2011: 408-409). The R “List” package (Blair and 
Imai 2014) provides us with a statistical test to rule out the alternative hypothesis 
that answers to baseline items are indeed affected by the inclusion of the test item. 
Interestingly, however, the “no design effect” assumption does not require subjects 
to give honest responses to baseline items (either in direct or list count ways). SDR 
on baseline items is an independent question, which we will address in the concluding 
part of this article, because it may shed light on basic features of SDR. To this aim, 
the LISTB estimates (i.e., the group-based numbers of baseline items predictably 
accepted in the treatment conditions) can be compared to the corresponding 
amounts of baseline items predictably accepted by subjects in the CTRL condition 
(hereafter ACB, i.e., a “pseudo item count response” according to Tsuchiya et al., 
2007). The latter estimates can be easily obtained via OLS regression, and SDR on 
baseline items is accordingly computed as SDRb = ACB – LISTB. 
The second assumption is that respondents do not lie when reporting the number of 
items they agree with. Overall this “no liar assumption” is tenable, because list 
experiments were precisely designed to remove pressures from the social context 
and to lead respondents into believing that their true feelings are hidden to the 
experimenter. To some extent they are. As Blair and Imai (2012: 65-55) make 
clear, however, there are two situations in which privacy may be perceived to be 
threatened and, accordingly, responses may still be biased by social desirablity 
concerns. First, there is the possibility of a “ceiling effect”, which “is caused by the 
                                           
16  Corstange (2009) has proposed a similar method based on a different experimental design. 
However, Blair and Imai (2012) argue that their method is more precise and reliable, especially 
when the sample size is small. 
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fact that privacy is not protected for those respondents in the treatment group 
whose true preferences are affirmative for all the sensitive and control items” 
(2012: 65; emphasis added). In this case, respondents know that their answers to 
each item are completely identified and may thus be tempted to decrease their 
item count by one unit to restore ambiguity. Second, there is the possiblity of a 
“floor effect”, in which “some of the respondents whose truthful answer is 
affirmative only for the sensitive item (and thus negative for all control items) give 
[0] as an answer instead of the truthful [1]. This may occur when the control items 
are expected to generate many negative answers. In such a situation, the 
respondents in the treatment group whose truthful answer is affirmative only for 
the sensitive item may fear that their true preference for the sensitive item would 
be revealed by giving [1] as their answer” (2012: 65-66). It is important to note 
that both situations entail an artificial decrease in the average number of reported 
items in the treatment group. Fortunately, the R “List” package offers the possibility 
to estimate the extent of deflation in item counts stemming from ceiling and floor 
effects. Because the algorithm has to estimate two further unknown quantities, i.e., 
the proportion of ceiling and floor “liars”, it has to introduce additional constraints. 
These constraints require auxiliary information from the covariates entered into the 
model to account for variations in the acceptance of the test item (see Blair and 
Imai, 2012: 65-68). Thus, the use of a multivariate setup can be seen both as an 
enlargement of the predictive value of list experiments and as a requirement to 
establish their validity against potential failures.17 
 
4.3. Subjects 
In total, 185 students from various disciplines at the University of Bern, Switzerland, 
were recruited to participate in the study, through voluntary participation during a 
political science lecture, through announcements in other lectures, and through 
posters and leaflets in halls. Most subjects came from curricula in political science 
(28%), economics (20%), and history (13%), but significant numbers of subjects 
were drawn from other fields such as literature and linguistics, geography, sociology, 
psychology, and other human sciences. In addition, 20 apprentices (masons and 
sanitary technicians) were enrolled at a training school in the same town.18 Overall, 
more male subjects (63%) than female subjects (37%) participated in the study; 
likewise, the number of Swiss citizens (80%) greatly exceeded that of foreigners 
(20%). As regards age, a majority of participants were 22 or younger, but all ages 
between 17 and 32 years were represented in the sample (M=23.1, SD=5.7). 
Subjects recruited outside the political science lecture were paid 20 Swiss francs 
(about US$16 at the time) for their participation. 
The choice of students as experimental subjects is both pragmatic and theory-driven. 
Leftist orientations of students have been proverbial since the campus unrest of the 
late 1960s in the United States, France, or Germany. As a matter of fact, most 
studies of students’ values and attitudes have uncovered evidence that the student 
                                           
17  For further discussion of the “no design effect” and “no liar” assumptions, see Zigerell (2011) 
and de Jonge and Nickerson (2012). In particular, Zigerell (2011) considers the possibility (and 
finds some evidence) that, in situations where ceiling and floor effects are expected, item counts 
may be deflated (and sometimes inflated) by more than one unit. These most extreme violations 
of the “no liar” assumptions might occur when respondents are particularly eager to dissociate 
from strongly undesirable behaviors or traits, or to associate with strongly desirable ones.  
18  The rationale for recruiting apprentices was to increase the variance in key variables, such as 
chronic and issue-specific knowledge, issue involvement, age, and ideology. However, because 
apprentices are arguably a different population from that of students, we controlled for the 
specific contribution of the apprentice data to our SDR estimates. None of the conclusions of our 
empirical analysis were substantially altered by including or excluding apprentices. 
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“subculture” is biased toward liberal/leftist views, even though this liberal advantage 
has ebbed and flowed in recent decades (e.g., Dey, 1997; Pryor et al., 2012). 
Importantly, the distribution of political preferences varies between academic fields. 
These differences reflect either socialization, whereby faculty and peer group 
influence within each academic field tends to make students’ preferences more 
homogenous over time (e.g., Alwin et al., 1991; Liu et al., 2009), or self-selection, 
whereby initial preferences determine which academic subjects are chosen in the first 
place and no further “indoctrination” is to be expected from curriculum experiences 
(e.g., Kemmelmeier et al., 2005; Hastie, 2007). Most probably, both mechanisms are 
at work, but in varying degrees according to the type of academic discipline.19  
This being said, normative influence also operates in a larger sociopolitical context 
than mere curriculum or faculty (e.g., Dey, 1997; Pascarella and Terenzini, 2005: 
293-295; Hurtado et al., 2012). As already noted, “campus norms” are extremely 
important and may overwhelm the influence of other peer groups. However, the 
influence of population attitudes (at the city, regional, or national level) should not 
be underestimated. It is perhaps worth noting that the University of Bern, where 
our experiment took place, is situated in the German-speaking area of Switzerland. 
Compared with their French- and Italian-speaking fellow citizens, Swiss Germans 
have been more reluctant to develop welfare state institutions and to defend them 
against retrenchment.20 
 
4.4. Moderator variables 
As we argued in the presentation of our hypotheses, SDR is conditional on a 
number of situational and personal characteristics, which may either facilitate or 
inhibit the effect of social desirability pressures. Ten potential moderator variables 
were selected for their applicability in the context of this study: general and issue-
specific political knowledge, left-right self-placement, age, sex, academic discipline, 
belief activation, personal salience of welfare state issues, daily time devoted to 
political information, and nationality (Swiss vs. foreigner or binational). Some of 
these moderators are expected to be involved both in the “private” evaluation of items 
and in the response editing process leading to their “public” acceptation. Hence, the 
scaling of variables permitting, nonlinear relationships with SDR are conceivable. The 
construction of moderator variables is described in Appendix B. 
                                           
19  For example, political attitudes of students (and faculty staff) in economics are commonly 
biased in a right-wing direction. This tendency is more likely to stem from self-selection in the 
economics curriculum than from indoctrination through economic education (Carter and Irons, 
1991; Manley et al., 2001; Kemmelmeier et al., 2005). Economists tend to attach more 
importance to self-enhancement values and less importance to universalistic values and 
electoral participation (Gray and Wuffle, 2005; Gandal et al., 2005). Likewise, they tend to 
behave in a more selfish way, for example acting as “free riders” in the provision of public 
goods (Frey and Meier, 2003). Indeed, a similar right-wing bias obtains in our student sample, 
where the economists’ mean left-right self-placement of 4.30 (on a 0-10 scale) is statistically 
different from the political scientists’ mean of 3.24 (t=3.37, p<.002) and the historians’ mean 
of 2.46 (t=4.91, p<.001). By usual standards, however, a majority of economics students in 
our sample would qualify as left-wingers. To be sure, this may indicate that social desirability 
already occurs in the ideological self-description of some students. 
20  German-speaking citizens tend to put more emphasis on individual responsibility and work 
ethics than Latin citizens. This is immediately visible in the between-region differences in 
voting patterns on welfare state issues (Obinger et al., 2005: 341; Freitag and Vatter, 2006: 
100). Survey evidence (Eugster et al., 2011) shows that German-speaking citizens’ support for 
welfare policies is comparable to the support measured in liberal countries (e.g., US, Australia, 
Japan), whereas French-speaking Swiss are much closer to the norm of less market-oriented 
neighbour countries such as Italy and France. 
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The “belief activation” variable deserves further consideration. A procedure was 
introduced to manipulate the number of accessible beliefs about welfare state issues 
respondents have in mind when undertaking the list experiment task. This procedure 
is directly inspired from the ANES “likes and dislikes” questions about parties and 
presidential candidates. Prior to the SDR questions, subjects were asked to list the 
first five reasons that come to mind for supporting and opposing the welfare state 
and Swiss EU membership, respectively.21 The real purpose of the questions was to 
conjure up contradictory “ideas” and feelings about the welfare state, including 
social normative reasons subjects may not really endorse but feel convenient to 
express at the beginning of the experiment. In sum, by asking subjects to think in 
detail about welfare state issues, the procedure was meant to “refresh” and 
diversify their relevant beliefs, to make them more accessible in memory, and thus 
to foster ambivalence on welfare state issues. According to Hypothesis 1, this 
should lead to heightened SDR.  
Importantly, the belief activation questions were posed to only half the subjects in 
each of the CTRL, ITEM4, and ITEM3 conditions. Belief activation thus constitutes a 
second factor, orthogonal to the variation in the format of SDR questions derived 
from the List Experiment (see Table 2). For purposes of analysis, though, belief 
activation will be used as a moderator variable in SDR, much in the same way as 
subjects’ personal characteristics such as political knowledge, academic training, or 
age.  
Table 2: The experiment’s 2×3 factorial design, with number of 
subjects in parentheses 
Belief 
activation 
Type of SDR questions  
CTRL ITEM4 ITEM3 Total 
Non-activation (36) (36) (36) (108) 
Activation (35) (30) (32) (97) 
Total (71) (66) (68) (205) 
 
                                           
21  The questions read: “Why is the welfare state a good idea? What are the positive conse-
quences? Please write down the first ideas that come to mind! (…) In contrast, what is it about 
the welfare state that you do not find so appealing? Please write down the first ideas that come 
to mind!” Similar questions were posed about the “idea of joining the EU”. These pros and cons 
questions were not meant as a memory probe (subjects were instructed not to try “to fill the 
whole list at any price”) nor even as a measure of overall attitudes toward the two issues. 
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5. Empirical results 
5.1. Assessing the covert and overt acceptance of test items 
Multivariate analysis was applied to our experimental data to estimate the effects of 
individual and situational variables on the various components of item agreement: 
• LISTT and LITSB: Blair and Imai’s ICTREG algorithm (R “List” package; Blair 
and Imai 2014) was used to estimate effects on item counts in list conditions; 
• ACT and ACB: logistic and linear regression was used to estimate effects on 
agreement with the test and baseline items in the CTRL condition. 
The results of these analyses are presented in Tables 3 to 5. Before we comment 
on the results, it is necessary to explain how the ACT model was built. As can be 
seen from the tables, the effects of some variables are left aside. To explain why 
this simplification of our models was unavoidable, it should be stressed that the full 
models fitted the data very poorly (in all lists) and that estimated coefficients were, 
with few exceptions, non-significant and obviously unreliable. Thus the poor fit of 
the ACT models reflected real problems in estimating the effects of the various 
predictors. First, with as many as 14 predictors and little more than 60 observations, 
degrees of freedom proved insufficient to allow for reliable estimates. A second 
problem was that, as stressed above, our dependent variables are highly skewed 
toward agreement with the test items (94%, 82%, and 88% for Lists 1, 2, and 3, 
respectively). Given this distribution, the presence of “quasi-separation” usually 
leads to systematic biases in estimated coefficients when conventional methods are 
used.22 As a matter of fact, this problem proved intractable in List 1, where all logistic 
regression coefficients and standard errors were immensely inflated and therefore 
useless for estimation purposes, but the problem also loomed large in Lists 2 and 3. 
When confronted with a degrees-of-freedom and/or a quasi-separation problem, 
classical regression models will tend to produce unreliable coefficients, and thus 
alternative estimation methods are needed. Two strategies were used here to help 
circumvent these problems. First, penalized maximum likelihood (PML) was chosen 
as an alternative to traditional maximum likelihood; it is probably the best suited 
estimation method when data are completely or nearly separated (Heinze, 2006). 
Second, we used backward variable selection (based on likelihood ratio tests) to 
remove “noisy” variables whose inclusion in the model prevents a better estimation 
of “real” predictors.23  
Before turning to the interpretation of the LISTT models in Tables 3 to 5, we must 
consider the possibility that the underlying assumptions of these models are violated 
                                           
22  Quasi separation, i.e., the fact that a linear combination of independent variables predicts 
the dichotomous outcome almost perfectly, is all the more likely and problematic as the sample 
size is small and the number of variables in the model is large (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2000: 
139). 
23  We put two constraints on the backward selection process. First, we stopped the procedure 
as soon as at least two predictors were significant (p<.10). Second, to enhance our capacity to 
compare effects between treatments and thus to ascertain SDR, we made sure that all variables 
which appeared as significant predictors (p<.05) in the LISTT regression were included in our 
models. The only exception was the exclusion of the “foreigner” variable from the ACT model 
for List 3. The effect of this variable was still impossible to determine even using PML analysis, 
because estimates were obviously unreliable in all tested models. As a matter of fact, the huge 
coefficients and standard errors point to the fact that our data are highly separated with 
respect to the “foreigner” category: all subjects rejecting the “tax fairness” item were Swiss 
citizens, and all foreign subjects approved of it. 
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(see section 4.2). First, we must rule out the possibility that the inclusion of the test 
item in the long list did not affect respondents’ answers to baseline items. Our 
examination of this “no design effect” assumption provided reassuring results. None 
of the Bonferroni-corrected significance tests indicates that answers to baseline 
items might have been “contaminated” by adding the test item.24 Second, we must 
examine the “no liar” assumption that respondents’ answers to the count questions 
are indeed truthful. As explained above, the existence of ceiling and floor effects 
would question this assumption, because such effects imply that some respondents 
deliberately misreport the total number of items they agree with in order to avoid 
being associated with the test item. The test of this assumption, using the algorithm 
available in the R “List” package, could not be performed in its full form (i.e., 
allowing an estimation of each covariate’s contribution to the amount of ceiling and 
floor lying), because degrees of freedom were insufficient and problems of complete 
separation (also due to small sample size) led to computational problems.25 Instead, 
we ran an intercept-only model (assuming that the propensity to “lying” was 
roughly the same in all student subgroups) to estimate the population proportion of 
ceiling and floor “liars” for each List. This test yielded a quite moderate proportion 
of floor liars, varying between 0.4% (List 3), 1.0% (List 1), and 2.4% (List 2). 
Likewise, the proportion of ceiling liars was modest in List 2 (0.8%) and List 3 
(3.9%); however, it was much higher in List 1 (15.7%).26  
Overall, then, violations of the “no liar” assumption were limited in scope, and do 
not appear to threaten the validity of the whole procedure except in List 1. Based 
on these tests of formal assumptions, we might stop here our analysis of List 1 and 
proceed with the other lists. Indeed, we will avoid drawing any independent 
conclusion from List 1 results. However, we decided to maintain this list in our 
forthcoming multivariate analysis to see whether corroborating evidence may be 
found for the role of moderators in SDR. To the extent that moderators play similar 
roles in List 1 and in the other two lists, this would tend to reinforce our confidence 
in our results.27 The other way round, we will refrain from interpreting findings from 
List 1 when they lead to different conclusions than findings from the other lists. 
Looking at Tables 3 to 5, there appears to be remarkably few similarities across 
Lists; that is, there are few (if any) effects which persist from one set of items to 
the next. First, general knowledge is systematically related to the acceptance of the 
test items (though the relationship is only marginally significant in List 3). The more 
                                           
24  All Bonferroni-corrected p-values from our three Lists are greater than .30, leading us to 
accept the null hypothesis of no design effect. 
25  The problem of (quasi) complete separation is not uncommon in list experiments. However, 
the solution suggested by Blair and Imai (2012: 67), namely to add “weakly informative priors” 
to the model for floor/ceiling effects (implemented through the bayesglm tool in the R “List” 
package), does not work for our data — probably because several variables are involved in 
separation. On the one hand, our model may indeed be too complex and unstable; Graeme 
Blair (personal communication, August 2016) acknowledges that the number of variables in the 
model “is likely one problem” because “these models are fragile and hard to estimate”. On the 
other hand, the common solution of omitting the best predictors to prevent separation is 
suboptimal and leads to specification bias (Zorn 2005: 161-162; Gelman et al. 2008: 1361); in 
addition, the comparability and sheer utility of the model is threatened if its specification 
changes from one list to the next and does not correspond to the multivariate moderator 
model tested below. Accordingly, an intercept-only model was tested to estimate overall 
proportions of floor and ceiling liars. 
26  Due to the computational problems mentioned above, no standard error could be estimated 
for the population proportions of ceiling and floor liars. However, it seems fair to say that only 
List 1 produces estimates which are undoubtedly biased by floor and ceiling lying behavior. 
27  Although the results for List 1 are made unreliable by the estimated 15 percent of “floor 
liars”, the likelihood that a moderator would show a reverse effect in the absence of lying is 
extremely small. 
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subjects knew about Swiss political institutions and leaders, the more likely they 
were to accept the sensitive statements about welfare entitlement, job 
nondiscrimination, and tax fairness. Second, age also tends to be associated with 
test item acceptance, as younger subjects were less favourable toward the items 
than were older subjects — but the effect is only significant in List 1, which is 
plagued by ceiling effects (see above). Third, personal salience is also related to the 
acceptance of test items in two Lists. In this case, however, the effect is inconsistent: 
subjects who expressed high concern about welfare state issues were more likely to 
accept the tax fairness item (List 3) but less likely to accept the job 
nondiscrimination item (List 2). Other effects emerged in some Lists (such as the 
reduced acceptance of the “tax fairness” item among foreigners / binationals and 
political science students in List 3) but failed to show up in at least another List. 
Likewise, the ACT models did not show a discernible pattern of effects on the overt 
acceptance of test items. Yet a couple of effects may be noted for single Lists. 
Middle-aged subjects (22-23 years olds) were less likely to support the tax fairness 
item than their older counterparts. Similarly, younger subjects (up to 21 years) 
were less likely than their elders to endorse the job nondiscrimination item. In 
contrast, this item was largely supported by subjects with longer exposure to 
political news. Finally, it may be noted that extreme left subjects were more likely 
than center-right subjects to accept the tax fairness statement. 
One reason for the lack of clear-cut results is related to the difficulties to predict the 
endorsement of statements which — at least in public situations — are virtually 
universally accepted, so that little variation is left to be explained. To account for the 
(few) differences that did exist in the answers of the various groups, one may argue 
that certain categories of subjects were simply better aware of where the social norm 
stood, while others were not (or misperceived the norm). Accordingly, it may be that 
certain categories (e.g., older, better informed subjects) knew how to adjust their 
answers to the norm, while others did not. This is precisely what SDR analysis is all 
about. Therefore, we should not take the scattered results from our ACT models as 
evidence that SDR did not occur in our experiment. It is only through comparing 
overt and covert answers that the underlying factors and mechanisms of SDR may be 
uncovered — a task to which we turn in the next section. 
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Table 3: Multivariate analysis of the List Experiment questions and the direct questions (List 1; test item = 
“welfare entitlement”) 
 
Test item,  
list estimates (LISTT) 
Baseline items,  
list estimates (LISTB) 
Test item,  
direct question (ACT) 
Baseline items,  
direct questions (ACB) 
  Est. S.E. p Est. S.E. p Est. S.E. p Est. S.E. p 
Intercept 1.222*** 0.386 0.002 1.793*** 0.274 0.000 1.401+ 1.188 0.238 1.869*** 0.181 0.000 
General Knowledge = high 0.463** 0.228 0.045 -0.024 0.080 0.766 1.052 1.328 0.428 -0.057 0.102 0.582 
Specific Knowledge = high 0.048 0.198 0.811 -0.016 0.094 0.866 1.781+ 1.407 0.206 0.106 0.097 0.278 
Daily Information > 30 min. 0.167 0.253 0.509 -0.172+ 0.119 0.151 -0.749 1.379 0.587 0.088 0.112 0.433 
Personal Salience = high -0.070 0.228 0.761 0.192+ 0.136 0.161 0.858 1.092 0.432 -0.034 0.088 0.702 
Age = up to 21 y. -0.638** 0.277 0.024 0.134+ 0.109 0.222 1.794+ 1.363 0.188 0.072 0.120 0.553 
Age = 22-23 y. -0.210 0.199 0.293 0.104+ 0.087 0.234 2.643* 1.596 0.098 0.016 0.115 0.889 
Sex = Female 0.024 0.231 0.918 -0.048 0.104 0.644    -0.107 0.111 0.340 
Ideology = Extreme Left  -0.100 0.235 0.670 0.060 0.108 0.581 -1.309 1.528 0.392 0.065 0.127 0.612 
Ideology = Center / Right -0.389+ 0.321 0.228 -0.101 0.179 0.574 -1.175 1.294 0.363 -0.181+ 0.120 0.139 
Discipline : Political Science -0.443+ 0.281 0.118 0.179 0.174 0.305    0.064 0.149 0.670 
Discipline : History -0.269 0.388 0.490 -0.059 0.229 0.799    -0.050 0.176 0.777 
Discipline : Others -0.168 0.335 0.617 -0.029 0.157 0.855 -2.334* 1.309 0.075 0.054 0.145 0.713 
Nationality = Foreigner / Binat. 0.182 0.229 0.428 -0.033 0.127 0.797    0.075 0.162 0.646 
Activation of Beliefs = Yes -0.128 0.163 0.435 0.072 0.085 0.396 1.171 1.120 0.296 -0.037 0.087 0.674 
Notes: ***: p<.01; **: p<.05; *: p<.10; +: p<.25. The reference categories for the various predictors are as follows: General Knowledge = low; Specific 
Knowledge = low; Daily Information < 30 min.; Personal Salience = low; Age = 24 years and older; Sex = Male; Ideology = Moderate Left; Discipline = 
Economics; Nationality = Swiss; Activation of Beliefs = No. For the ACT model, reference categories include those modalities for which no regression coefficient 
could be computed (e.g., the reference for academic discipline includes economics as well as political science and history). 
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Table 4: Multivariate analysis of the List Experiment questions and the direct questions (List 2; test item = 
“job nondiscrimination”) 
 
Test item,  
list estimates (LISTT) 
Baseline items,  
list estimates (LISTB) 
Test item,  
direct question (ACT) 
Baseline items,  
direct questions (ACB) 
  Est. S.E. p Est. S.E. p Est. S.E. p Est. S.E. p 
Intercept -0.609 0.622 0.330 2.490*** 0.490 0.000 1.975* 1.188 0.096 2.004*** 0.332 0.000 
General Knowledge = high 0.839** 0.351 0.019 -0.451* 0.248 0.072 -0.716 0.946 0.449 0.015 0.180 0.935 
Specific Knowledge = high 0.602** 0.303 0.050 -0.514** 0.212 0.017 0.832 0.906 0.359 0.195 0.183 0.293 
Daily Information > 30 min. 0.694+ 0.431 0.111 -0.318+ 0.252 0.211 2.170** 1.027 0.035 -0.416** 0.197 0.042 
Personal Salience = high -1.165*** 0.421 0.007 0.426+ 0.260 0.105 0.048 0.713 0.947 -0.102 0.160 0.529 
Age = up to 21 y. -0.255 0.370 0.492 0.059 0.229 0.799 -1.832* 1.078 0.089 -0.008 0.216 0.971 
Age = 22-23 y. -0.502+ 0.371 0.178 0.079 0.281 0.778 -0.881 1.025 0.390 -0.404* 0.213 0.066 
Sex = Female 0.353 0.357 0.325 -0.133 0.223 0.553    -0.509** 0.197 0.014 
Ideology = Extreme Left  0.325 0.443 0.465 -0.460+ 0.283 0.107    0.321+ 0.244 0.197 
Ideology = Center / Right 0.479 0.468 0.309 -0.159 0.277 0.568 1.012 1.014 0.318 -0.259 0.223 0.253 
Discipline : Political Science 0.388 0.548 0.480 -0.024 0.419 0.955    0.421+ 0.259 0.112 
Discipline : History -0.100 0.907 0.913 0.106 0.452 0.814    0.120 0.335 0.723 
Discipline : Others 0.864* 0.510 0.094 -0.514+ 0.384 0.184 -0.690 0.760 0.364 0.552** 0.268 0.047 
Nationality = Foreigner / Binat. 0.506+ 0.347 0.148 -0.564** 0.258 0.031    0.174 0.283 0.544 
Activation of Beliefs = Yes 0.554* 0.310 0.077 0.002 0.215 0.991 -0.338 0.713 0.636 -0.031 0.156 0.843 
Notes: See Table 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
29
Table 5: Multivariate analysis of the List Experiment questions and the direct questions (List 3; test item = 
“tax fairness”) 
 
Test item,  
list estimates (LISTT) 
Baseline items,  
list estimates (LISTB) 
Test item,  
direct question (ACT) 
Baseline items,  
direct questions (ACB) 
  Est. S.E. p Est. S.E. p Est. S.E. p Est. S.E. p 
Intercept 1.333** 0.532 0.014 2.067*** 0.352 0.000 1.630+ 1.271 0.200 2.399*** 0.242 0.000 
General Knowledge = high 0.398+ 0.293 0.177 -0.175 0.175 0.322 -0.633 1.103 0.566 0.011 0.134 0.936 
Specific Knowledge = high 0.052 0.268 0.846 -0.141 0.163 0.389 1.034 1.186 0.383 -0.188+ 0.128 0.149 
Daily Information > 30 min. -0.109 0.321 0.736 0.059 0.182 0.749    -0.133 0.149 0.378 
Personal Salience = high 0.556** 0.269 0.042 0.112 0.180 0.534 0.503 0.847 0.552 0.153+ 0.118 0.202 
Age = up to 21 y. -0.514+ 0.316 0.107 -0.099 0.200 0.623    0.059 0.160 0.712 
Age = 22-23 y. -0.242 0.327 0.462 -0.061 0.213 0.776 -1.920* 1.031 0.063 0.088 0.152 0.564 
Sex = Female 0.092 0.307 0.765 -0.137 0.145 0.347 -0.950 0.896 0.289 0.038 0.145 0.796 
Ideology = Extreme Left  -0.494+ 0.327 0.135 -0.131 0.193 0.498 2.923* 1.740 0.093 0.273+ 0.175 0.125 
Ideology = Center / Right -0.591+ 0.420 0.163 -0.072 0.224 0.749 -0.896 1.248 0.472 0.356** 0.158 0.029 
Discipline : Political Science -0.705* 0.380 0.067 0.598** 0.261 0.024 0.246 1.393 0.860 -0.396** 0.195 0.048 
Discipline : History -0.694+ 0.489 0.159 0.322 0.304 0.291 -0.609 1.387 0.661 -0.362+ 0.234 0.129 
Discipline : Others -0.328 0.417 0.433 0.258 0.231 0.266 0.878 1.448 0.544 -0.291+ 0.194 0.139 
Nationality = Foreigner / Binat. -0.752** 0.362 0.040 0.363* 0.187 0.055    -0.406* 0.206 0.055 
Activation of Beliefs = Yes 0.170 0.289 0.558 -0.188 0.186 0.313 0.494 0.819 0.547 -0.088 0.114 0.444 
Notes: See Table 3. 
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5.2. Assessing Socially Desirable Responding (SDR) 
We begin to implement our measurement strategy with respect to the overall 
amount of SDR in each of the three Lists. In this case, estimating SDR is quite 
straightforward: 29 SDR = ACT – LISTT + LISTB, with standard error 
 
2 2 2
ACT LISTT LISTB
SDR
ACT LISTT LISTB
ˆ
s s s
N N N
σ = + + .  
A SDR score of zero indicates a strict equivalence of estimates for overt and covert 
treatments and hence the lack of any tendency to hide one’s true preferences. 
Table 6 gives the overall estimates for each List. As it turns out, the amount of SDR 
is rather small, as it ranges between 8 percent (List 1) and 18 percent (List 3). 
(Recall, however, that results for List 1 are not reliable due to ceiling effects, which 
probably leads to an underestimation of SDR in this list). In addition, the estimate is 
(marginally) significant only in List 3 (p<.07, one-tailed test). Our evidence thus 
suggests that few people hide their true preferences on socially sensitive topics.  
Table 6: Acceptation of items and estimates of SDR (all subjects) 
 
Acceptation of  
test item (ACT) 
Number of  
accepted items 
(LISTB) 
Number of  
accepted items 
(LISTT) 
SDR estimate  
(ACT – LISTT + 
LISTB) 
 %  Std. dev. N Mean  
Std. 
dev. N Mean 
Std. 
dev. N % s.e. 
p (1-
tailed) 
LIST 1 
(welfare entitl.) 94.3 23.4 70 1.912 0.334 68 2.773 0.627 66 8.2 9.2 0.186 
LIST 2 
(job nondiscr.) 81.7 39.0 71 1.632 0.710 68 2.318 0.880 66 13.1 14.6 0.185 
LIST 3  
(tax fairness) 88.1 32.7 67 2.162 0.536 68 2.864 0.742 66 17.9 11.9 0.068 
 
Overall, SDR on the tax fairness issue is modest and not significantly larger than SDR 
on the welfare entitlement and job nondiscrimination issues. However, as a tentative 
answer to our Research Question (section 3.3), these differences suggest that SDR 
increases as a function of some “concreteness” gradient. Leaving the welfare 
entitlement issue aside, we note that the job nondiscrimination issue is only 
moderately concrete and personalized, as subjects might worry about a future labor 
market competition with foreigners. In contrast, the tax fairness issue elicits the 
greatest extent of SDR, perhaps because it promises to have the most concrete and 
immediate consequences for one’s material situation. Although comparative evidence 
is generally lacking, this interpretation is consistent with findings showing little SDR 
on “abstract” and unobtrusive issues such as the environment (Milfont, 2009). 
However, these omnibus estimates may conceal greater differences between specific 
groups of subjects. To address this question, we compute predicted SDR scores for 
each group in each List, using estimates from Tables 3 to 5. For this purpose, we 
                                           
29  In this context, no multivariate analysis is required to get the ACT, LISTT and LISTB 
estimates: they are simply the overall proportions (or mean numbers) of accepted items in the 
various treatments. However they may also be conceived of as means or proportions estimated 
from models in Tables 3 to 5, provided that all variables are kept at their mean values. We do 
not assume homogeneity of variances across treatments (an assumption that is rarely met in 
our data), and thus we use a corrected version of the t-test for independent samples, with 
degrees of freedom based on Satterthwaite approximation. 
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calculate the difference between the predicted LISTT and ACT scores; for example, 
predictions for male subjects in List 2 are 0.55 and 0.86, respectively, from which we 
obtain an SDR score of 0.31 (which, in this case, is not statistically significant).30 Table 
7 presents all SDR scores computed with this method. Clearly enough, cases of SDR 
are exceptions rather than the rule. More often than not, within-group comparisons of 
overt and covert responding do not provide sufficient evidence of SDR, at least from a 
statistical point of view. However, the few significant results in Table 7 are, as a whole, 
consistent with our hypotheses and lead to fairly plausible conclusions. We will focus 
here on findings from Lists 2 and 3 — we return to List 1 later on for comparison 
purposes. 
To begin with, according to our “non-involvement hypothesis”, individuals with a 
more diffuse political profile should be more susceptible to SDR. In line with this 
expectation, low levels of general political knowledge are conducive to SDR in both 
Lists. When judging support for sensitive items from direct questions, the differences 
between poorly and highly knowledgeable subjects do not exceed 9 percentage points 
across Lists, but the difference is markedly higher in the list estimates (ranging 
between 40 and 84 percentage points). This suggests that the very high level of 
support for the job nondiscrimination and tax fairness statements which was 
demonstrated in answers to direct questions can be seen as a true endorsement of 
these principles on the part of knowledgeable subjects, but not on the part of less 
knowledgeable subjects. The latter probably lack the self-confidence to speak out their 
egoistic or anti-foreigner gut feelings. Interestingly, it is perhaps not by chance that 
general political knowledge appears to moderate the magnitude of SDR to some 
extent, whereas specific knowledge about welfare state issues and daily news 
consumption do not (with the exception of specific knowledge in List 2). Better than 
other measures, general political knowledge may reflect an overall subjective feeling of 
competence and legitimacy to express personal opinions. This disposition, which 
broadly corresponds to Bourdieu’s (1979) and Gaxie’s (2007) “statutory competence”, 
was hypothesized to inhibit self-presentation biases. 
The same line of reasoning applies to the role of age in List 3, where younger subjects 
appear more susceptible to SDR than their elders. Again, younger subjects overtly 
approved of liberal positions at rates comparable to (or higher than) older subjects, 
but their list counts were estimated to be clearly lower. All in all, this suggests that 
younger subjects tended to hide their true feelings about the tested items when 
given the opportunity to do so. Similar expectations hold with respect to the personal 
salience of welfare state issues. When relatively indifferent toward such issues, most 
individuals may not want to meet the costs of social opprobrium and are induced to 
disguise their true feelings. This is what we found for the tax fairness issue (List 3): 
SDR was more common among subjects who do not care much about welfare state 
issues. But, interestingly, the opposite relationship seems to be true when involvement 
was arguably least relevant, i.e., on the job nondiscrimination issue (List 2).31 Finally, 
sex does not seem to play much of a role in SDR, at least with respect to welfare 
issues. 
                                           
30  The standard error of the difference between the LISTT and ACT predicted scores is computed 
simply as the square root of the sum of score variances. As we cannot assume homogeneity of 
variances across treatments, we use a corrected version of the t-test for independent samples, 
with degrees of freedom based on Satterthwaite approximation. 
31  Let us assume that, in List 2, the huge difference in SDR estimates between low- and high-
salience subjects contains a grain of truth. It might then be argued that, unlike in List 3, welfare 
state matters were not directly relevant to judging the job nondiscrimination issue, but that 
caring about the welfare state generated ambivalence by promoting egalitarian values and 
setting up a clash with self-interest. In this sense, issue salience may have played a different role 
in List 2 than it did in List 3, and this role may have more to do with our ambivalence hypothesis.  
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Table 7: Agreement with the test items and SDR estimates in various subgroups, Lists 1–3 (187 ≤ N ≤ 191) 
 LIST 1 (WELFARE ENTITLEMENT) LIST 2 (JOB NONDISCRIMINATION) LIST 3 (TAX FAIRNESS)  
 
X1: List 
Experiment 
X2: Direct 
Question 
SDR estimate  
(X2 – X1) 
X1: List 
Experiment 
X2: Direct 
Question 
SDR estimate  
(X2 – X1) 
X1: List 
Experiment 
X2: Direct 
Question 
SDR estimate  
(X2 – X1)  
Subjects’ characteristics Mean  S.E.  Mean S.E.  Mean diff. S.E.  
p (2-
tailed) Mean  S.E.  Mean S.E.  
Mean 
diff. S.E.  
p (2-
tailed) Mean  S.E.  Mean S.E.  
Mean 
diff. S.E.  
p (2-
tailed) 
Significant contrasts  
(p≤.10, 2-tailed) 
Low general knowledge 0.625 .148 0.942 .047 0.317 .155 .043 0.326 .241 0.895 .063 0.569 .249 .024 0.542 .186 0.915 .061 0.373 .196 .058 LIST 1: low vs. high (p<.05) 
LIST 2: low vs. high (p<.02) High general knowledge 1.088 .137 0.979 .028 -0.109 .140 .435 1.165 .258 0.806 .098 -0.359 .276 .194 0.940 .192 0.852 .092 -0.089 .212 .677 
Low specific knowledgec 0.795 .148 0.922 .058 0.126 .159 .428 0.369 .225 0.819 .076 0.450 .237 .059 0.683 .185 0.845 .077 0.163 .200 .418 
none 
High specific knowledge 0.843 .117 0.986 .020 0.143 .119 .230 0.970 .241 0.912 .064 -0.058 .250 .816 0.735 .176 0.939 .059 0.204 .185 .272 
Daily information < 30 min. 0.743 .141 0.971 .033 0.228 .145 .118 0.360 .231 0.728 .083 0.369 .246 .135 0.760 .196 0.894 a .052 0.134 .202 .509 
none 
Daily information ≥ 30 min. 0.910 .168 0.940 .052 0.030 .176 .864 1.053 .325 0.959 .037 -0.094 .328 .774 0.651 .206 0.894 a .052 0.243 .212 .255 
Low salience of WS issues 0.855 .149 0.941 .047 0.086 .156 .581 1.261 .250 0.862 .069 -0.400 .259 .125 0.432 .200 0.867 .078 0.435 .215 .044 LIST 2: low vs. high (p<.005) 
LIST 3: low vs. high (p<.07) High salience of WS issues 0.785 .140 0.974 .029 0.189 .143 .188 0.097 .299 0.867 .068 0.771 .306 .013 0.988 .160 0.915 .055 -0.073 .169 .667 
Up to 21 years 0.487 .191 0.972 .035 0.485 .194 .014 0.688 .290 0.716 .120 0.028 .314 .928 0.466 .208 0.940 .043 0.474 .213 .027 
LIST 1: 21– vs. 24+ (p<.01) 
LIST 3: 21– vs. 24+ (p<.03) 22-23 years 0.914 .109 0.988 .019 0.074 .111 .506 0.441 .284 0.867 .081 0.426 .296 .151 0.738 .224 0.696 .137 -0.042 .262 .873 
24 years and more 1.125 .170 0.852 .089 -0.273 .192 .160 0.944 .267 0.940 .051 -0.003 .271 .990 0.980 .225 0.696 .137 -0.284 .263 .283 
Man 0.811 .130 0.961 a .032 0.150 .133 .263 0.550 .235 0.865 a .054 0.314 .241 .194 0.676 .173 0.924 .050 0.248 .180 .171 
none 
Woman 0.835 .162 0.961 a .032 0.126 .165 .447 0.903 .267 0.865 a .054 -0.039 .272 .887 0.768 .218 0.824 .099 0.056 .240 .815 
Extreme left 0.847 .174 0.926 .080 0.080 .192 .681 0.779 .323 0.831 .068 0.052 .330 .876 0.525 .241 0.990 .019 0.465 .241 .056 
LIST 3: extreme left vs.  
moderate left (p<.05) Moderate left 0.947 .131 0.979 .024 0.032 .133 .809 0.454 .272 0.831 .068 0.376 .280 .181 1.019 .199 0.838 .078 -0.181 .214 .398 
Center/right 0.558 .301 0.935 .077 0.377 .310 .227 0.933 .426 0.931 .062 -0.002 .430 .996 0.428 .341 0.678 .213 0.250 .402 .534 
Discipline: political science 0.600 .178 0.984 .020 0.384 .179 .034 0.636 .227 0.893 .056 0.257 .234 .274 0.417 .231 0.886 .090 0.469 .248 .060 LIST 2: economics vs.  
other (p<.09) 
LIST 3: political science vs. 
economics (p<.08) 
Discipline: economics 1.042 .217 0.984 .020 -0.059 .218 .788 0.248 .459 0.893 .056 0.645 .462 .165 1.121 .306 0.859 .135 -0.262 .334 .434 
Discipline: history 0.773 .326 0.984 .020 0.210 .327 .521 0.148 .734 0.893 .056 0.745 .736 .314 0.427 .397 0.768 .165 0.340 .430 .430 
Discipline: other 0.874 .205 0.855 .088 -0.020 .223 .930 1.112 .292 0.807 .094 -0.305 .307 .322 0.793 .242 0.936 .057 0.143 .249 .566 
Swiss citizen 0.779 .115 0.961 a .032 0.182 .119 .129 0.567 .197 0.865 a .054 0.298 .205 .147 0.877 .146 0.894 a .052 0.017 .155 .913 LIST 3: Swiss vs.  
foreigner (p<.03) Foreigner or binational 0.962 .174 0.961 a .032 0.000 .177 .998 1.073 .315 0.865 a .054 -0.208 .319 .516 0.125 .304 0.894 a .052 0.769 .309 .014 
Belief activation: no 0.879 .123 0.933 .052 0.054 .134 .687 0.424 .241 0.883 .062 0.459 .249 .067 0.631 .181 0.868 .072 0.237 .195 .226 
LIST 2: no vs. yes (p<.09) 
Belief activation: yes 0.751 .117 0.978 .025 0.227 .120 .060 0.978 .228 0.843 .075 -0.135 .240 .575 0.801 .196 0.915 .057 0.114 .204 .578 
Notes: Predicted values are based on models in Tables 3–5. a : Groups for which no Direct Question estimate is available are attributed the estimated means from 
the PML models (i.e., the predicted ACT value when all variables are set to their means); these estimates differ from the aggregate proportions displayed in Table 6 
because, compared to the difference-in-means approach, the multivariate approach is based on a smaller sample due to missing values in some predictors. 
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Overall, we find some supportive evidence that SDR is more widespread among 
individuals with less cognitive political resources, and almost no evidence pointing to 
the opposite relationship. The part played by “cultural capital” in promoting tolerance 
and equality, as shown in many studies, does not seem to be undermined by social 
desirability concerns (for similar conclusions, see Heerwig and McCabe 2009). 
Turning now to our “ambivalence hypothesis”, SDR is expected to prevail among 
people who hold ambivalent attitudes about an issue. In the context of this study, 
we assume that ambivalence stems largely from a conflict between values and 
affective orientations, on the one hand, and utilitarian, selfish goals, on the other 
hand. Which ingredients of ambivalent attitudes will dictate overt responses to some 
sensitive issue is expected to depend on the mix of social identifications and ensuing 
social norms which are made salient by the context and by the specific items. In this 
regard, three types of identification groups may be primed by the questions: 
ideological groups, membership groups (in this context, the student community and 
the lower-level curriculum groups), and national community. These were assessed 
by left-right self-placement, academic discipline, and the distinction between Swiss 
citizens and foreigners/multiple citizens, respectively. Finally, the procedure of 
“belief activation” is assumed to foster ambivalence, because subjects are required 
to list both the pros and cons of the welfare state issue as they perceive it. 
The particularity of most of these variables is twofold. First, they are associated 
both with the likelihood of genuinely disagreeing (or agreeing) with some issue and 
with the likelihood of providing a socially desirable response, given disagreement; 
this allows for the possibility of nonlinear relationships between moderators and 
SDR. Second, the expected effects of these variables strongly depend on the 
response context, and especially on the nature of items. Left-right orientations can 
serve to illustrate these two aspects. In this study, all three tested items might be 
characterized as social-democratic or leftist, or even “socialist”. Subjects who 
define themselves politically as “far left” or “moderate left” likely share the values 
underlying these items. Endorsement of these values, in turn, is reinforced by 
identification with ideological groups (“the left”, “Social Democrats”, or “anti-
capitalists”) and/or with the “campus community”, which is usually tilted toward left 
values.32 When, however, left-wing subjects do disagree with the items, in particular 
because self-interest prevails over affect-laden moral considerations, they may feel 
greater pressure to conceal their “true” attitudes than do other student groups. This 
is because peer group influence combines with self-esteem goals to provide strong 
social desirability incentives. Conversely, right-wing subjects are more likely to 
disagree with the proposed items. At the same time, they may feel less pressure to 
conform to the majority view because their values and self-interest coincide. In 
addition, right-wing subjects may enjoy support for their ideas from other reference 
groups (including primary groups such as family and peer groups from the subjects’ 
own faculty or curriculum) which insulates them from the larger influence of the 
student community or misleads them into believing that their opinion is prevalent 
among students. All in all, which ideological group will show the greatest propensity 
for social desirability is an empirical question.33 
                                           
32  Indeed there was a strong left bias in our students’ sample. On a 0-10 left-right scale, the 
average self-placement in the students sample (excluding apprentices) was 3.3 (median=3), 
and more than 80 percent were posited to the left of the 0-10 scale midpoint. However, it may 
again be noted that left-right self-placement is likely to be itself affected by SDR. 
33  To some extent, similar considerations apply to a comparison of subjects’ academic disciplines 
and nationalities. As contrasted to economics and history, students in political science may be 
more susceptible to SDR because of their presumed higher endorsement of universalistic values, 
political correctness, and rejection of utilitarian motives of political action. Foreigners (including 
“binationals”, i.e., Swiss citizens holding a second nationality) may feel particularly committed to 
the policy goals embodied in our test items (at least in Lists 1 and 2), since these policies may be 
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As shown in Table 7, subjects’ self-reported ideology mattered only with respect to 
the tax issue (List 3). Extreme left students were unanimous in supporting tax 
fairness when asked directly about it; however, taking covert responses into 
account, they appear significantly more susceptible to SDR than moderate left 
students. Nothing comparable occurs in List 2, where all three ideological groups 
have similar SDR scores. Thus, there is only partial evidence to support our 
hypothesis about the role of left-right orientations in SDR. Likewise, the role played 
by our subjects’ academic discipline seems rather modest. As hypothesized, 
political scientists do appear particularly susceptible to SDR with respect to the tax 
fairness issue (an estimated 47 percent of them hide their true feelings about this 
issue). But none of the other groups shows a significant propensity to SDR.34 
Importantly, our multivariate framework allows us to rule out the possibility that 
political scientists display a heightened susceptibility to SDR simply because they 
make up a disproportionate share of extreme left-wingers.35  
The nationality of our subjects (i.e., the distinction between Swiss and foreign/ 
multiple citizens) seems to matter in some circumstances. However, SDR was 
detected where we least expected it, namely for the issue of tax fairness (List 3) — 
and not on the job nondiscrimination item. On the tax issue, the SDR estimate for 
Swiss subjects is virtually 0, while it is nearly 80 percent and highly significant 
(p<.02) for foreigners and multiple citizens! Only about one tenth of foreigners 
actually supported the tax fairness policy goal in covert conditions, as compared to 
90 percent supporting it in their answers to the direct question. Arguably, opposing 
fiscal redistributive policies can be perceived as a threat to the welfare of minorities 
which are the main recipients of these policies. As a matter of fact, foreign students 
have better life chances than most members of their national community. 
Therefore, rejecting wealth redistribution on ideological or utilitarian grounds and 
failing to live up to moral obligations toward one’s community may arouse feelings 
of guilt and betrayal leading to SDR.36 
Finally, turning to the role of belief activation in SDR, our analysis yields inconsistent 
results. On the one hand, these results suggest that subjects who answered the 
likes/dislikes questions were either no different from those who did not (List 3) or 
less susceptible to SDR (List 2). In fact, answers to the job nondiscrimination item 
reveal a substantial contrast between the “activation” and “no activation” groups 
which is exactly the opposite of that implied by our ambivalence hypothesis. That is, 
subjects who were asked to express their pros and cons toward the welfare state 
were clearly less susceptible to SDR than subjects who were not instructed to do so. 
                                                                                                                           
seen to profit first and foremost the foreign labor force and other socially disadvantaged groups. 
However, when ambivalent about the test items, notably because their own interests are 
perceived to conflict with their salient values and allegiances, foreign students may downplay 
utilitarian considerations in their overt answers, but probably not in their list counts. 
34  On the tax fairness issue (List 3), political science students are significantly different from 
economics students, as the latter overwhelmingly supported the welfare entitlement item in 
both overt and covert answering conditions. The other significant contrast (between economics 
and “other” disciplines in List 2) distinguishes groups whose SDR scores, by themselves, do not 
differ from zero at conventional levels of statistical significance. History students have SDR 
scores comparable to their political science counterparts; however, the small size of this group 
drives these tendencies away from statistical significance. 
35  In fact, there are more left-wingers in disciplines where SDR estimates are lower than for 
political scientists (e.g., history, geography, literature and linguistics, and other human sciences). 
36  Alternatively, it may be argued that the principle of tax fairness is supported by foreigners in 
their direct responses, but that the implementation of the principle is perceived as unfair to 
one’s family (assuming its revenues are modest) and thus rejected in the item counts. This 
kind of “policy-implementation” gap is a staple of public opinion analysis which is amenable to 
our ambivalence hypothesis, since principle and implementation have different implications for 
public values and private interests. 
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One possible explanation for this finding is that the likes/dislikes questions about 
the welfare state are not well tailored to opinions on the job nondiscrimination issue 
and that attitudinal ambivalence may be inconsequential for SDR on this particular 
issue. Instead, asking subjects about their likes and dislikes, that is, about matters 
of personal taste and judgment, may bring about a self-individuating process, as 
shown by the use of similar experimental procedures (e.g., Ambady et al., 2004). 
Consistent with the notion of an individuation–categorization continuum (Fiske et 
al., 1999), inducing subjects to focus on their own beliefs and motives could 
deemphasize group identities. Accordingly, self-focused subjects might attach less 
importance to social expectations. However, if this reasoning has some validity, it 
remains unclear why it does not extend to the other tested issues. 
To what extent does evidence obtained for List 1 (“welfare entitlement” item) provide 
confirmation of the above findings? Remember that, due to the presence of “ceiling 
liars” (see section 5.1), results for this list are to be taken with extreme caution; 
however they may be used as auxiliary evidence about the role of moderators insofar 
as they reproduce findings obtained in other lists. By and large, results from List 1 
square well with the evidence discussed above. To begin with, these results are 
consistent with the hypothesis (supported in the two other lists) that SDR is 
associated with low levels of general knowledge. Likewise, younger subjects and 
political science students may be especially prone to SDR, which is consistent with 
results from List 3. Further, political ideology seems unrelated to SDR in List 1 — 
like in List 2, but unlike List 3; this would tend to buttress the idea that ideology is 
at stake in providing socially desirable answers to some kinds of issue, but not to 
others. Finally, our analysis of List 1 suggests that subjects whose beliefs were 
“activated” were indeed more susceptible to SDR. Although this is in line with our 
ambivalence hypothesis, we may recall that the results from List 2 suggested an 
opposite relationship between belief activation and SDR. Accordingly, it seems safe to 
say that no solid evidence can be adduced in favor of the belief activation hypothesis. 
 
5.3. Comparison with the “difference-in-means” method 
We have analyzed the present data using the more classical “difference-in-means” 
(i.e., bivariate) approach briefly exposed in section 4.2. This allows us to compare 
group estimates found using either method — bivariate or multivariate — and to 
determine whether SDR values based on the difference-in-means approach are at 
least good approximations of SDR values obtained with more sophisticated methods. 
Because the ceiling effect in List 1 examined above will appear regardless of the 
analytical method, we keep all three lists in this comparison. 
Averaging over all groups and Lists (i.e., 24 groups × 3 lists), overall SDR scores 
look much the same for the bivariate vs. multivariate method (0.13 vs. 0.16). 
However, these average values conceal much of the variation observable within 
particular groups. Thus, the typical difference in a group amounts to 0.14, and it is 
about twice as large with respect to the job nondiscrimination item (List 2) as it is for 
the two other items (0.21 vs. 0.10). In addition, bivariate estimates typically have 
less sampling variability and are more precise.37 Accordingly, smaller SDR estimates 
from the bivariate method may emerge as statistically significant, whereas larger 
SDR estimates from the multivariate method may not.  
All told, the differences in empirical results and conclusions drawn from either 
empirical approach are not overwhelming. All but five effects reported in Table 7 
were also obtained with the bivariate approach (p<.10). The other way round, nine 
                                           
37  Averaging over all groups and Lists, the standard error of our estimates amounts to 0.19 in 
the bivariate framework, as against 0.24 in the present study (average p-values are 0.22 and 
0.40, respectively). 
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of the 12 effects uncovered by the bivariate method also emerge in the multivariate 
analysis.38 In sum, there is admittedly a good deal of overlap between empirical 
results from bivariate and multivariate analyses. But if one considers the multivariate 
strategy followed in this paper a more reliable method to detect SDR tendencies, 
then our comparison suggests that the use of the bivariate method increases the risk 
of producing both “false negatives” (overlooking actually existing relationships) and 
“false positives” (uncovering individual characteristics that purportedly enhance SDR 
when in reality they do not). 
Therefore, the multivariate approach recommended in recent years is certainly the 
better choice. For another thing, it allows researchers to take into account omitted 
variable bias and to rule out a number of spurious relationships. Take for example 
the relative SDR estimates of male and female respondents in List 2. Bivariate 
analysis suggests that 45 percent of women and 0 percent of men (both estimates 
with large standard errors) made socially desirable responses to the job 
nondiscrimination item. This significant contrast (p<.08), however, does not pass a 
multivariate test (see Table 7). If anything, it appears that men were possibly 
susceptible to SDR (p<.20) while women were not — even though this gender 
difference is not significant. What probably accounts for this reversal of findings is 
the lack of independence between factors explaining SDR tendencies. As it turns 
out, gender is strongly related to general political knowledge (χ2=22.3, p<.001; 
Φ=.33), which is one of the most important predictors of SDR on this item. It may 
thus be argued that male-female differences in SDR are mostly attributable to this 
covariate, and not to gender per se. Accordingly, the impact of gender disappears 
when SDR is studied in a multivariate framework. 
 
5.4. Little lies and some bad conscience? 
Unlike most list experiments whose results have been published so far, the CTRL 
group in our experiment was asked direct questions on all items, i.e., on test and 
baseline items. This design feature enables us to compare the number of baseline 
items accepted via the direct questions in the control group with the number of 
baseline items accepted via the short list count.39 The difference between these two 
values provides an estimate of the extent of SDR on baseline items. (Again, we 
draw attention to the fact that covert answers to baseline items in List 1 show 
evidence of a ceiling effect; accordingly, the difference between item counts and 
“pseudo” item counts from overt questions is artificially reduced, and findings from 
this list should be interpreted with caution). Building on this, we ask two questions 
that may shed additional light on the nature and mechanisms of SDR. First, is there 
SDR on baseline items too? Second, if there is evidence of SDR on baseline items, 
is it related in any way to SDR on test items?  
The answer to the first question is a qualified “yes”. Collapsing all subgroups and 
focusing on SDR on baseline items, the overall difference between “overt” and 
“covert” conditions is negligible in Lists 1 and 3 (∆ = –0.04 and 0.05, respectively; 
both ps>.40), but in List 2 it is substantial and highly significant (∆ = 0.30; p<.01). 
This suggests that we should not assume a priori that SDR only occurs with respect 
to “sensitive” items (see also Zigerell, 2011). Put another way, it is certainly worth 
                                           
38  By “effects” we mean here all significant within-group differences between direct answers 
and list counts, either in the positive or (much more rarely) in the negative range. 
39  Estimates were obtained in exactly the same way as for the acceptance of test items. 
Multivariate analysis using the ICTREG procedure was applied for the estimation of baseline 
counts from the ITEM3 and ITEM4 groups; OLS multiple regression was used to predict the 
number of accepted items in the CTRL group. 
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asking whether baseline items in our Lists are really as “nonsensitive” as they may 
seem, and which factors contribute to untruthful answers on these items.40 
The second question invites us to compare SDR by the same groups in reaction to 
different categories of items. From a theoretical perspective, three types of 
relationships between SDR on test items and SDR on baseline items can be 
expected. First, there may be no relationship at all. For example, those who are 
prone to SDR on one type of items are just as likely to show a positive, negative or 
nonexistent SDR score on the other type of items — in a nutshell, SDR on test 
items and SDR on baseline items are entirely distinct phenomena. Second, the two 
SDR measures may be positively related. This is what should be expected if, at 
least for a substantial proportion of subjects, SDR originates from a stable 
disposition (e.g., a personality trait) rather than from contextual cues related to 
particular circumstances. Third, the two measures may be negatively related. In 
this case, compensatory mechanisms may be at work, such that individuals who 
“lie” on one item (either test or baseline) consciously or unconsciously avoid lying 
on other items. 
Figure 1 gives an overview of SDR on both test and baseline items in all three Lists 
and for each subgroup of subjects. In practical terms, all groups for which 
confidence intervals are in the positive range and do not include the zero value are 
likely to comprise a significant proportion of “liars” (p<.10). Figure 1 allows us to 
draw a number of interesting conclusions. First of all, many respondents “lied” on 
baseline items, too! Across the various Lists (but in particular in List 2), no less 
than thirteen categories of subjects display a positive and statistically significant 
SDR score on baseline items, and eight categories have an estimated average SDR 
score of 0.5 or higher. For example, in List 2, subgroups such as politically 
knowledgeable, older, extreme left, or foreign/naturalized subjects were estimated 
to overreport their agreement with baseline statements by about 0.5 items or more 
(all ps<.05). More importantly, another striking feature of Figure 1 is that SDR on 
test items and SDR on baseline items do not appear to follow the same pattern. 
More often than not, categories of subjects showing a high propensity to engage in 
SDR on the test item do not show a similar tendency with respect to baseline items. 
The other way round, most categories appearing to conceal their true feelings on 
baseline items are found to be “sincere” on test items.41 Overall, then, these results 
are suggestive of a negative relationship between SDR on test items and SDR on 
baseline items. 
Because we are dealing with aggregate results, we should beware of fallacious 
inferences.42 Therefore, we conducted another analysis that goes some way toward 
individualizing SDR estimates, enabling us to test whether the interplay of social 
desirability mechanisms on test and baseline items can be explained at the individual 
level. This analysis is premised on the fact that subjects in our experiment are 
characterized by multiple attributes (such as age or ideology), each of which can be 
associated with heightened or reduced social desirability propensities (see Figure 1). 
Accordingly, we use the models presented in Tables 3 to 5 to predict the net result of 
all individual characteristics on each subject’s SDR score. Regardless of which 
                                           
40  At this point, it is important to recall that the existence of SDR on baseline items does not 
imply a violation of the “no design assumption” examined above. However, in the event where 
SDR on test items and SDR on baseline items are systematically related, the question of 
whether respondents give dishonest answers on baseline items deserves further examination. 
41  Overall, there is just one category that engaged in SDR on both types of items (p<.10), 
namely subjects who received “no belief activation” in List 2. 
42  In particular, we cannot assume that the same individuals were the driving force of 
aggregate tendencies, and that those who gave untruthful answers on one type of items (say, 
test items) were mostly honest on the other type (say, baseline items) — although it may 
sometimes be the case. 
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treatment group subjects were assigned to, their characteristics are used to yield 
predicted values from which we derive individual social desirability scores on the test 
item and on baseline items:  
We compute predictions for the whole set of subjects for whom we have valid 
observations on all variables, since they reflect the full distribution of variables from 
which the regression coefficients were generated. Properly speaking, SDR scores 
are not merely “estimated” in this way, but rather “simulated” in the sense that 
each individual score (say, for a subject in the CTRL group) is based, in part, on 
individual responses obtained in other experimental conditions (say, from subjects 
in the ITEM3 and ITEM4 treatment groups). Accordingly, the tilde symbol in ~SDRti 
and ~SDRbi scores stands for the fact that these individual scores are simulated. In 
this sense, our method breaks from conventional inferential statistics and must be 
considered a heuristic tool for broadly comparing SDR measures which are otherwise 
unavailable on a purely individual basis. Again, because the “individual” scores are in 
fact a compound of information gathered from many subjects, we cannot rule out 
that the relationship between ~SDRti and ~SDRbi, interpreted here heuristically as if 
scores were measured within single individuals, is a mere illusion of the simulation 
framework. With this caution in mind, we show in Figure 2 the relationship between 
simulated ~SDR scores on both types of items. 
Figure 2 largely confirms what the analysis of subgroups at the aggregate level has 
suggested. There is a moderate, negative, and not perfectly linear relationship 
between ~SDRti and ~SDRbi. It is also substantially stronger for List 2 than for Lists 
1 and 3; in general, though, the same relationship holds for all Lists. To be sure, 
there is a good deal of uncertainty in the data displayed in Figure 2, owing to 
cumulative prediction errors at each estimation step and to the simulation framework 
underlying the figure. Still, the overall pattern in Figure 2 is consistent with the 
aggregate analysis discussed earlier and cannot be dismissed so easily. When SDR on 
test items is high, the odds are that SDR on baseline items is relatively limited. 
Conversely, when SDR on test items is low, SDR on baseline items tends to be more 
pronounced.  
Building on these results, we now consider what individual-level mechanisms might 
account for the kind of “sincerity-deceit” trade-off suggested in Figures 1 and 2. As 
a first working hypothesis, we may assume that individuals do not have unlimited 
tolerance for their own deceptive behavior. Confronted with a list of four items, and 
without any suspicion that one of them is the target of the experiment, subjects 
may be tempted to hide their true feelings on some of these items. Beyond some 
threshold, however, the psychological cost incurred from perceiving oneself as a liar 
may exceed the satisfaction experienced from complying with social norms. For 
many individuals, so the hypothesis goes, the acceptable limit amounts to a “single 
little lie”. Accordingly, subjects who provide an untruthful answer to the test item 
should feel compelled to give sincere answers to all other (baseline) items; the 
other way round, subjects who are honest on the test item should find it tolerable 
to conceal their true opinion about one of the baseline items. If at least a 
substantial minority of subjects conforms to this pattern, it follows that ~SDRti and 
~SDRbi should be inversely related.  
 
 
 39 
Figure 1: Estimates of SDR (●: test items; ●: baseline items) with 90% confidence intervals  
-1.2 -0.8 -0.4 0.0 0.4 0.8 1.2 1.6 2.0  -1.2 -0.8 -0.4 0.0 0.4 0.8 1.2 1.6 2.0  -1.2 -0.8 -0.4 0.0 0.4 0.8 1.2 1.6 2.0  
 List 1 List 2 List 3 
General knowledge = low 
General knowledge = high 
Specific knowledge = low 
Specific knowledge = high 
Daily information = low 
Daily information = high 
Issue salience = low 
Issue salience = high 
Age = up to 21 years 
Age = 22–23 years 
Age = 24 years and more  
Sex = male 
Sex = female 
Ideology = extreme left 
Ideology = moderate left 
Ideology = center/right 
Discipline = political science 
Discipline = history 
Discipline = economics 
Discipline = other  
Nationality = Swiss 
Nationality = foreigner 
Belief activation = no 
Belief activation = yes 
 
  
 
40 
Figure 2: The relationship between SDR on test items and SDR on baseline items 
 
List 1: ŷ = – 0.0515x2 – 0.2229x + 0.0394 (R2 = 0.187) 
List 2: ŷ = – 0.2089x2 – 0.8945x + 0.5690 (R2 = 0.368) 
List 3: ŷ = – 0.6532x2 – 0.0220x + 0.1736 (R2 = 0.138) 
Note: predicted values for LISTT were truncated for values higher than 1 and lower than 0. 
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This introspective mechanism may explain why social desirability does not weigh 
equally on responses to item and baseline items. However, it does not account for 
the variations between groups depicted in Figure 1. In this respect, two main factors 
may be distinguished. First, some characteristics may be inversely related to ~SDRti 
and ~SDRbi for largely incidental reasons having to do with our particular choice of 
baseline items.43 Second, and related to the previous point, groups probably vary in 
their perceptions of the sensitiveness of baseline items. For example, politically 
aware individuals may see a policy issue as complex, multidimensional and 
potentially contentious, and hence may be reluctant to take sides, while other 
individuals may not see much of a problem in the issue. This may be especially the 
case with the more “technical” issues raised in List 2. Alternatively, some categories 
of subjects may be disproportionately undecided and unaware of the social norm on 
some of the baseline issues. Subjects from such categories may tend to choose more 
often the DK option when responding to direct questions, but we would expect them 
to follow some rule of thumb when answering the list questions. This is a question 
that has not received attention from researchers using list experiments (Lax et al., 
2014: 19), and it is unclear whether items on which subjects are unable to take 
position tend to be counted as “accepted” or “refused”. Although it may contribute to 
explain the pattern of results shown in Figure 2, the issue of indecision and DK 
answers requires a deeper examination. To investigate this question, we provided 
subjects in the CTRL group with the possibility to pick a “don’t know” answer (DKA) 
to the direct questions. We reasoned that such answers may originate either in 
strategic reasons (to disguise a socially undesirable opinion) or in true indecision or 
ambivalence. 21% of subjects provided at least one DKA to baseline items in List 2, 
as against 3% in List 1 and 1% in List 3. Our analysis of List 2 (not shown here, but 
available upon request) suggests that DKAs hint at true indecision, rather than being 
fake answers designed to conceal socially reprehensible opinions. It also indicates 
that indecision is related to a heightened propensity to count obscure items as 
“accepted” in list conditions. 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have assumed that social desirability responding (SDR) occurs 
about as frequently in matters of welfare policy as it does in many other fields. In 
particular, the statement that “taxes should be raised more equitably, even if I or 
my family were to be taxed more heavily” appears to have elicited biased 
responses from a non-negligible proportion of subjects. These might have felt that 
refusing to contribute directly to more equality in the distribution of the tax burden 
would seem too selfish or mean-spirited. On the other hand, the proposal was suffi-
ciently unattractive to warrant refusal when it could go unnoticed. 
Recent advances in the “List Experiment” method allowed us to conduct a 
multivariate analysis of SDR moderators. In this analysis, three variables stand out 
as particularly relevant for explaining variations in SDR scores: political knowledge, 
age, and academic discipline. To begin with, subjects with poor political knowledge 
were especially likely to overreport their approval of the welfare entitlement, tax 
                                           
43  For example, in List 2, politically aware subjects appear truthful in their support for equality 
and social justice (as encapsulated in their answers to the test item), but they may be more 
reluctant to voice their opposition to the “popular sovereignty” argument raised in baseline items 
1 and 2 on matters of European integration (see Appendix A). The other way round, subjects 
with less political knowledge were shown to be rather dishonest on test items (in all three Lists). 
At the same time they may be more prone to adhere to the “simplistic” view that the popular 
will should dictate policymaking and that all matters of foreign policy are to be settled by a 
popular vote; hence, they may approve baseline items without much afterthought. 
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fairness, and job nondiscrimination items; younger subjects were also inclined to do 
so, except for the last item. We interpret these findings as evidence that individuals 
with less involvement toward politics are less committed to their own opinions and 
less willing to “publicly” maintain a socially undesirable position. Uninvolved 
individuals are thus more likely to go where the wind blows — in this case the wind 
of the “campus community”. In contrast, the non-involvement argument falls short 
of explaining why political science students were more susceptible to SDR (at least 
on two of the three issues) than were subjects from other disciplines. Instead, our 
ambivalence hypothesis posits that individuals who have conflicting considerations 
about an issue are more likely to comply with social norms. We assume that the 
self-interest of many political science students collided with their deeply entrenched 
values or beliefs toward social matters, which increased the gap between “covert” 
and “overt” opinions. The fact that academic discipline was more consistently 
associated with SDR than other variables supposed to foster ambivalence (ideology, 
nationality, belief activation) is not entirely surprising. To some extent, political 
science students should be better aware of the majority (i.e., “politically correct”) 
opinion than students from other curricula, not least because they are expected to 
talk frequently about politics with other people, both within and outside the campus 
community. 
On a more technical note, we have shown that list experiments can be successfully 
applied to ordinary issues reaching beyond the usual “gut responses” and “anger 
items” studied in early research using this method. Simple paper-and-pencil 
questionnaires are fit for purpose. Likewise, our research suggests that various 
types of baseline items may be used (including those which themselves elicit SDR), 
as well as test items which are almost universally accepted. However, despite its 
promises, the present research also has a number of important limitations. First, 
unlike the survey experiments used in most list experiment research, our study 
combines the disadvantages of small-N quantitative analysis (unstable and inaccurate 
estimates, under-detection of effects, etc.) with those of controlled experiments — 
most particularly low external validity. Our results do not readily generalize to other 
student communities, let alone to the population of Switzerland or other countries. 
Second, our tests of the ambivalence and non-involvement hypotheses are admittedly 
very crude. Moderator variables were subjectively chosen because they appeared to be 
good proxies for these two key factors (e.g., political knowledge for measuring the 
non-involvement dimension), but also because they allow for a comparison with other 
studies using the same (rather standard) variables. In any case, it should be the task 
of future investigations to develop direct and internally valid measures of 
ambivalence and non-involvement. 
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Appendix A: Wording of items in all lists 
List 1: 
• Employment offices should help the unemployed to find a new job. (% agreeing 
in CTRL group: 93.0) 
• Foreigners should have the same rights to social services as Swiss 
citizens, if they have lived and worked a long time in Switzerland. 
(94.3) 
• Women should not be entitled to social benefits, they can always become 
housewives. (0) 
• The state should ensure a decent living standard to the needy elderly. (94.3) 
 
List 2: 
• Whenever the issue arises, the Swiss people should have the right to decide 
whether they want Switzerland to join the EU. (94.1) 
• The bilateral agreements concluded with the EU do not give the EU the right to 
dictate Swiss policy toward third countries (i.e., non-EU members). (84.7) 
• As a compensation for joining the EU, we may accept to give up important 
elements of our advanced transport policy (e.g., heavy vehicle fee, protection of 
the Alps, transfer of goods transport from road to rail). (16.2) 
• Foreign job seekers with equal skills and experience should not be 
discriminated against in favour of Swiss job seekers. (81.7) 
 
List 3: 
• Someone who has not contributed to pension schemes (old age and survivors 
insurance, occupational pension funds) should not receive a pension or social 
benefits at retirement age. (30.0) 
• The state should provide primary health care services. (93.0) 
• Taxes should be raised in a more equitable manner, even if I or my 
family were to be taxed more heavily. (88.1) 
• No full-time worker should live under the so-called poverty line. (98.6) 
Appendix B: Construction of moderator variables 
General political knowledge  
General political knowledge was measured using a set of factual knowledge questions. 
First, four questions were asked to measure the subjects’ knowledge of fundamental 
institutions of the Swiss political system: (a) popular initiative; (b) federalism; (c) the role 
of Parliament in electing the government members; and (d) the number of governing 
parties. One point was assigned for each correct answer (half points were also assigned to 
responses that were incorrect but not far off the mark). The scores were summed to 
produce a first knowledge scale (α = .71). Second, questions aimed to measure the 
subjects’ knowledge of political leaders. A list of six leaders was provided, whose renown 
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was presumably either quite high (3 of them) or rather low (3 of them). The task was to 
associate each leader with his or her party among four possible options, i.e., the four 
main governing parties (SP, CVP, FDP, SVP). One point was assigned for each correct 
answer, and the scores were also summed to produce a second knowledge scale (α = 
.75). As the two scales are highly correlated (r = .65), they were standardized and 
summed to yield a single scale of general political knowledge, ranging from 0 to 10 
(M=7.6, SD=2.4; 23% of subjects with highest score). The variable was dichotomized 
with a cut-off value of 8.5 (low=60 percent of subjects). 
Issue-specific knowledge  
Four questions were included in the questionnaire to gauge the subjects’ knowledge of 
welfare policies (similar questions were asked about Swiss European policy, so as to 
prevent subjects from thinking that welfare issues were the focus of the experiment). 
For example, we asked which area of welfare state activity was introduced only in 2004 
in Switzerland (the correct answer, maternity insurance, was to pick from a list 
containing three other response options: unemployment insurance, disability insurance, 
and compulsory health insurance.) One point was assigned for each correct answer; the 
scores were summed to produce a scale of issue-specific knowledge (α = .65), ranging 
from 0 to 4 (M=3.0, SD=1.2; 47% of subjects with highest score). The variable was 
dichotomized with a cut-off value of 8.0 (low=53 percent of subjects). 
Daily information 
News exposure was assessed by the following question: “On average, how much time a 
day do you spend following political news on national and international affairs?” The five 
response categories were combined into a low exposure (up to 30 min.; 58 percent of 
subjects) vs. high exposure (more than 30 min.) dichotomy.  
Personal salience 
The question reads: “How important to you personally is the issue of the role and 
performance of the Swiss welfare state?” An eleven-point scale was provided, from 
“very unimportant” (0) to “very important” (10), with a DK option. The variable was 
dichotomized with a cut-off value of 8.0 (low=51 percent of subjects). 
Ideology  
Ideology was tapped by a single question of left-right self-placement, ranging from 0 to 
10, with a DK option. As one would have expected given the population from which our 
sample of subjects was drawn, the ideology measure is skewed toward leftist positions 
(M=3.6, SD=1.9), with some 74% of subjects positioning themselves to the left of the 
scale midpoint. The scale was partitioned into three categories: extreme left (positions 0–
2; 30 percent of subjects), moderate left (3–4; 44 percent), and center/right (5–10; 26 
percent). 
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